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ARTICLES
The Constitution in Congress: The First
Congress and the Structure of
Government, 1789-1791
DAVID P. CURRIE
When we think of constitutional interpretation, we think first of the
courts. But judges are not the only public officials who interpret the Constitu-
tion. Legislators and executive officers do so every day. Whenever Congress
considers a bill, for example, the first question it must answer is whether it
has power to enact it; it is the Constitution that answers that question.
Sometimes the constitutional question is never discussed. That in itself is
a significant fact, for it suggests that no one doubted congressional authority.
Often, however, constitutional questions are debated at length and with great
dexterity both in executive communications and in the halls of Congress.
Though the records of early congressional proceedings are incomplete,1 they
afford us precious insights into how the Constitution was understood by those
charged with making it a reality. Unlike judicial opinions, moreover, con-
gressional debates on constitutional issues are largely unknown; to explore
them is, for most of us, to embark on a voyage of discovery.
The place to begin this voyage is at the beginning. The first Congress
convened in New York on March 4, 1789, and adjourned for the last time on
March 3, 1791. In a separate article I have discussed the myriad of substantive
issues, from taxation and trade to constitutional amendment and the admission
of new states, that were addressed during that period.' My present subject is
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1. The principal source is Joseph Gales, ed, Annals of Congress (Gales and Seaton,
1834). I have supplemented them where necessary with references to other contempora-
neous accounts being collected in Linda Grant De Pauw, ed, Documentary History of the
First Federal Congress of the United States of America (Johns Hopkins, 1972).
2. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First
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an equally variegated and fascinating array of structural constitutional issues
that confronted the same Congress when it began to set up the government of
the United States.3
I. Congress
The Constitution had a good deal to say about the structure and proceed-
ings of Congress. Seats in the House of Representatives were to be apportioned
among the states according to population and filled for two years by popular
elections in which voter qualifications were tied to those set by state law.4
Each state legislature was to choose two Senators for staggered six-year
terms.' Distinct age, citizenship, and residence requirements were prescribed
for Representatives and for Senators, and provision was made for filling vacan-
cies.6 The "Times, Places, and Manner" of elections were to be determined by
state law, unless Congress-"except as to the Places of chusing Sena-
tors"-should otherwise provide.7 Individual members were entitled to com-
pensation determined by law,' enjoyed a limited immunity from arrest while
in session, and "for any Speech or Debate in either House" were not to be
Congress, 1789-1791, 61 U Chi L Rev 775 (1994).
3. Historians have written extensively about the issues that confronted the First Con-
gress. See, for example, John C. Miller, The Federalist Era (Harper & Brothers, 1960);
Forrest McDonald, The Presidency of George Washington (Kansas, 1974); Leonard D.
White, The Federalists (MacMillan, 1948); Irving Brant, James Madison: Father of the
Constitution 1787-1800 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1950); James Thomas Flexner, George Washington
and the New Nation (1783-1793) (Little, Brown, 1969); Dumas Malone, Jefferson and the
Rights of Man (Little, Brown, 1951); Forrest McDonald, Alexander Hamilton: A Biography
(WW Norton, 1979). For a concise summary, see Charlene Bangs Bickford and Kenneth
R. Bowling, Birth of the Nation: The First Federal Congress, 1789-1791 (First Fed Cong
Project, 1989).
4. US Const, Art I, S 2, cl 1.
5. Id S 3, cl 1, 2.
6. Id SS 2, 3. In each case there was to be a special election to fill the remainder of
the term; for the Senate there were to be interim appointments by the executive as well.
7. Id 5 4.
8. Congress voted its members a salary of six dollars for each day they were in
session plus travel expenses, providing a one dollar raise for Senators in 1795. Act of
September 22, 1789, 1 Stat 70, 70-71. The differential between the two Houses provoked
a lively and entertaining debate, but the only constitutional argument made in this connec-
tion was Representative Burke's insistence that disagreement between the House and Senate
not prevent fulfillment of the obligation imposed by Article I, section 6 to provide some
compensation to the members. See Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 676-84, 705-10, 923-26 (cited
in note 1). See also Representative Gerry's contention, id at 706-09, that legislative
independence required that members of Congress be fully compensated for their services.
One of the twelve constitutional amendments proposed by the First Congress would have
provided that no increase in congressional salaries could take effect until after the next
election, in order to keep the members from lining their own pockets; two hundred years
elapsed before it was ratified by three-fourths of the states, and its present status is
disputed. See id at 756-57; Gales, ed, 2 Annals at 2033-40 (cited in note 1).
2:161
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"questioned in any other Place."9
Congress itself was to meet "at least once in every Year."'" A majority
of each House would constitute a quorum, 1 and each member was to be
"bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution.""2 Each House
was authorized to judge "the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own
Members,"1 3 to select its own officers 4 (except that the Vice-President was
made President of the Senate),"5 to punish disorderly members, and (by a
two-thirds vote) to "expel a Member.""6 Each House was required to "keep
a Journal of its Proceedings"; 7 neither was permitted to "adjourn for more
than three days, nor to any other Place," without the other's consent;' the
President was empowered to convene one or both Houses "on extraordinary
Occasions." 9 Legislation required the agreement of both Houses and was
9. US Const, Art I, 5 6, cl 1.
10. Id 5 4, cl 2. This meeting was to take place "on the first Monday in December,
unless [Congress] shall by Law appoint a different Day." Id. When Congress adjourned its
first session on September 29, 1789, it enacted a statute providing for a second session
beginning on the first Monday of January, 1790. See Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 96 (cited in
note 1); act of September 29, 1789, 1 Stat 96. See also Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 1074,
adjourning the second session on August 12, 1790, to meet again the first Monday in De-
cember of the same year without embodying the decision in statutory form. Thus the First
Congress sat for three sessions in the space of two years, adjourning for the last time on
March 3, 1791, Gales, ed, 2 Annals at 1826, two years after the date set for the com-
mencement of its first session. For debate over the constitutionality of a resolution to fix
March'4, 1789, as the date on which the terms of members of the First Congress had be-
gun, see id at 1636-38 and Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 1010-11.
When the second session began, Congress had to confront the interesting question
of what to do about matters left unresolved at the end of the preceding meeting.
Representatives Lee, Page, and White argued that Congress should follow the British
Parliament's practice of considering all unfinished business de novo. Gales, ed, 1 Annals
at 1084-88.' Hartley responded that royal prorogation of Parliament was more final than
voluntary adjournment of Congress and objected to the waste of effort involved in re-
peating work done in a previous session. Id at 1092-94. For the time being, however,
both Houses voted to treat each session as an independent unit. Id at 1110-12. The end
of a session wiped any unfinished business from the table; bills could not become law
without being passed by both Houses within a single session. See id at 1115-18. For
Maclay's report of parallel Senate deliberations on this issue, see De Pauw, ed, 9 Docu-
mentary History at 185-91 (cited in note 1).
11. US Const, Art I, S 5, cl 1.
12. Id, Art VI, cl 3.
13. Id, Art I, 5 5, cl 1.
14. Id, §5 2, 3.
15. Id, S 3, cl 4.
16. Id, § 5, cl 2.
17. Id, § 5, cl 3.
18. Id, cl 4.
19. Id, Art II, S 3. President Washington called a special session of the Senate on
March 4, 1791, chiefly to secure confirmation of appointments to federal offices in
Vermont. See Currie, 61 U Chi L Rev at 839-40 (cited in note 2). Whether Congress had
inherent authority to call itself into special session ("[fthe Congress shall assemble at least
once in every Year"), or whether it could authorize itself to do so by setting a flexible
19951
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subject to a suspensive presidential veto.2"
As intricate as these provisions were, they obviously did not regulate every
procedural detail. Consequently each House was also authorized to "determine
the Rules of its Proceedings." 2
A. RULES
Deliberative bodies can scarcely function without procedural rules, and one
of the first acts of each House was to adopt them.22 The rules were simple, but
they established a number of important precedents.
Both Houses provided that bills should be read three times and might be
referred to committees. 23 The former provision could be said to encumber the
legislative process and the latter to restrict the participation of individual mem-
bers.24
Nevertheless both served to improve the quality of legislation-the one by
inhibiting impulsive action and the other by permitting a division of labor.
Moreover, both were sanctified by long tradition,' so that neither could well
date for its next meeting ("such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless
they shall by Law appoint a different Day"), the First Congress did not have to decide.
US Const, Art I, S 4, cl 1, 2 (emphasis added).
20. US Const, Art I, 5 7, cl 1, 2.
21. Id, S 5, cl 2.
22. See Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 20-21 (cited in note 1) (Senate); id at 102-06, 127-28
(House). See also id at 19 (conference procedure for resolving disagreements between the
two Houses).
23. Senate committees were to be elected by the members, House committees generally
appointed by the Speaker. Both Houses optimistically prohibited reading and conversing
while others were addressing the assembly. Id at 20-21 (Senate); id at 103 (House).
24. Two decisions of the German Constitutional Court illustrate the difficulty. In
holding by a divided vote that the election of a small committee to oversee the budget of
intelligence agencies was justified on security grounds although none of its members rep-
resented the unorthodox Green Party, the court acknowledged that the Basic Law im-
plicitly gave each representative an equal right not only to vote but to participate in
parliamentary deliberations and that arbitrary exclusion from committees on political
grounds would be unconstitutional. 70 BVerfGE 324, 355, 365-66 (Ger Const Ct, 1986).
See also id at 370 (Mahrenholz dissenting) (arguing that proportional representation of
parties on committees was a constitutional command). More recently, the same court flatly
held that a representative could not be denied all committee assignments simply because
he was not a member of any party: "The guiding principle . . . must be that of participa-
tion by every member." 80 BVerfGE 188, 219 (Ger Const Ct, 1989).
In contrast, and in accord with British precedent, the original Senate practice was
that "a Senator who opposed the basic purpose of a bill was not to be appointed to the
committee considering it. .. ." Roy Swanstrom, The United States Senate, 1787-1801 228
(GPO, 1988). Thus, "[in 1790 Hamilton's friends made certain that no opponents of the
Secretary's program were named to the committee preparing the bill to establish the Bank
of the United States." Id. Yet nobody seems to have complained: "committees were
regarded merely as instrumentalities to accomplish the purposes of the Senate majority."
Id at 229.
25. The English Parliament has assigned potential legislation to committees and required
2:161
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be said on its face to impair the constitutional principle of representative govern-
ment.
The House rules imposed additional restrictions, requiring that leave be
obtained in order to introduce a bill or speak more than twice on the same
question and forbidding members to vote on matters in which they were "imme-
diately and particularly interested.1 6 If these provisions can be defended, it is
on the ground that they went no further than was necessary to conduct business
in an efficient, fair manner. Nobody is recorded as objecting that either the
House or the Senate rules unconstitutionally limited the rights of individual
members.27
bills to be read three times before passage since at least the late sixteenth century. See
Thomas Smith, De Republica Anglorum 38-39 (Scolar, 1970); George Petyt, Treatise of the
Law and Custom of the Parliaments of England 186 (Scholarly Resources, 1974). The
Continental Congress continued these traditions. On its second day of deliberation, that
body created two committees, one "to State the rights of the Colonies in general" and the
other "to examine & report the several Statutes, which affect the trade and Manufactures
of the colonies." 1 Journals of the Continental Congress 26 (GPO, 1774). The Continental
Congress officially began requiring bills to be read three times before passage on May 4,
1781. 20 Journals of Continental Congress at 477-78 (cited in this note).
26. The practice of requiring leave for multiple speeches was common to both Par-
liament and the Continental Congress. See 1 Journals of Continental Congress at 26 (cited
in note 25). Instructive on the question of bills is another German decision in which the
court upheld the procedural requirement that bills be cleared by committee but struck
down a rule requiring that any spending proposal be accompanied by a provision for
financing it: substantive limitations on the content of bills infringed the constitutional
rights of the individual member. 1 BVerfGE 144 (Ger Const Ct, 1952).
Although the Continental Congress did not speak directly to the issue of conflicts
of interest, Jefferson cited ancient authority for such a rule: "Where the private interests
of a Member are concerned in a bill or question he is to withdraw. And where such an
interest has appeared, his voice has been disallowed, even after a division. In a case so
contrary, not only to the laws of decency, but to the fundamental principles of the social
compact, which denies to any man to be a judge in his own cause, it is for the honor of
the House that this rule of immemorial observance should be strictly, adhered to." William
Holmes Brown, Jefferson's Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives § 367 at
165 (GPO, 1979).
John Adams, then a delegate to the Continental Congress, told of an attempt to
prevent him from voting on matters concerning the Colonies' independence from Great
Britain because he held an office under the new government of Massachusetts and,
therefore, was "interested" in the question. Charles Francis Adams, 3 The Works of John
Adams 25-28 (Little, Brown, 1851); 4 Journals of Continental Congress at 125-27 (cited
in note 25). Presumably the conflict of interest provision adopted by the first House of
Representatives did not forbid farmers to vote on measures affecting farming; if it did it
would be difficult to reconcile with the principle of representative government.
27. Senator Maclay did raise objections with constitutional implications to the rule
providing for referring bills passed by both Houses to a joint committee for reconciliation
and correction of errors. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 58-59 (cited in note 1). This procedure,
he argued, gave the committee effective "power to alter the bill"-and thus, he seemed to
be saying, to usurp the legislative function. See De Pauw, ed, 9 Documentary History at
197 (cited in note 1).
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B. RECORDS
Article I, S 5 requires each House to "keep a Journal of its Proceedings"2"
and to publish those parts of it not requiring secrecy. It does not say that
congressional deliberations must be open to the public. The Senate chose to
operate behind closed doors for several years29 despite repeated arguments that
the blanket exclusion of the public was inconsistent with the principle of popular
government on which the Constitution was based."0
Moreover, neither chamber interpreted the journal provision to require a
verbatim transcript of its proceedings."' Senate debates were not reported at all
until the public was finally admitted to hear them, and House debates made it
into print only because it was in the interest of private entrepreneurs to record
them. 2 Senator William Maclay of Pennsylvania made notes of some of the
deliberations in the upper House,3 but they are sketchy and unpublished; and
there are significant gaps in the coverage of lower House proceedings as well. 4
28. US Const, Art I, S 5, cl 3.
29. See Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 15 (cited in note 1).
30. See, for example, id at 1005; Gales, ed, 2 Annals at 1810-12 (cited in note 1); De
Pauw, ed, 9 Documentary History at 389. The argument for closed doors was to promote
uninhibited discussion; the result was to make the House the center of attention. See
Harry Ammon, James Monroe: The Quest for National Identity 82, 84 (McGraw-Hill,
1971). In keeping its doors closed, however, "[t]he Senate was merely following in the
footsteps of its predecessor, the Congress of the Confederation ... " Swanstrom, The
United States Senate at 68 (cited in note 24).
31. It does expressly require publication of the yeas and nays whenever requested by
one-fifth of the members present, and both Houses complied with this provision. See, for
example, Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 51 (Senate); id at 380 (House).
32. Recognizing the value of public records of its debates, the House argued over
whether to allow private reporters to sit on the floor instead of in the public gallery in
order to minimize errors-one reporter had converted a regulation of "harbors" into a
regulation of "barbers"-but was unwilling to give them official sanction lest reporting
errors be attributed to the House itself. See Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 1095-98. Reporting
before the days of microphones and stenographic machines was a difficult business at best.
Senator Maclay complained that the official Senate Journal, which contained only the for-
mal actions of that body and a few messages from outsiders, revealed "neither System nor
Integrity." De Pauw, ed, 9 Documentary History at 181.
33. See De Pauw, ed, 9 Documentary History. Unfortunately for posterity, Maclay was
not reelected to the Senate in 1790. Id at xvi.
34. The Annals of Congress for 1789-1791 were taken primarily from Thomas Lloyd's
Congressional Register (so long as it was published) and (thereafter) from John Fenno's
Gazette of the United States. Other contemporary newspaper accounts are being collected
and published as a part of the Documentary History of the First Congress, but they are
incomplete as well. One reporter's editor, for example, "had required him to put every
day's proceedings into one paper, which forced much abbreviation." White, The Federalists
at 505 (cited in note 3). For further discussion of the inadequacies of the Annals, see
Charles F. Hobson, et al, eds, 12 The Papers of James Madison 63-64 (Virginia, 1979);
Hobson, et al, eds, 13 Madison Papers at 6-8 (cited in this note); James H. Hutson, The
Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 Tex L Rev 1,
2:161
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Nobody seems to have argued, as one might be tempted to argue today, that a
full and accurate public record was indispensable to informed electoral decision
and thus was embraced within the journal requirement or even-despite the pos-
sible negative inference from that provision-that it was implicit in the clauses
providing for congressional elections.
C. OFFICERS
Even before adopting its procedural rules, the House of Representatives
without reported debate had chosen Frederick Augustus Muehlenberg of Pennsyl-
vania as its Speaker and John Beckley as Clerk, in accordance with Article I, 5
2." In the Senate, Vice-President Adams took his constitutional responsibilities
seriously, not only presiding on a regular basis and breaking a number of ties
with his casting vote but participating in debates as well.3 7 Interpreting quite
literally the provision authorizing it to elect a President pro tempore "in the
Absence of the Vice President,"38 the Senate declined to elect a permanent
officer, making an ad hoc choice each time the Vice President was unable to at-
tend 9
35-38 (1986).
35. Compare Article 42 of the modem German Basic Law, which expressly requires
open proceedings absent a special need for secrecy, in order, as one Justice of the
Constitutional Court put it, that "those who are represented be in a position to form their
own judgment about the views of the delegates and parties in the assembly." 70 BVerfGE
at 369 (Mahrenholz dissenting).
36. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 100 (cited in note 1). Representative Smith of South
Carolina, who in a later Congress would have preferred Sedgwick as Speaker, nevertheless
said of Muhlenberg: "We are very well pleased with him, as he is a candid & impartial
Man." See George C. Rogers, Jr., ed, The Letters of William Lougbton Smith to Edward
Rutledge, 70 SC Hist Mag 38, 49 (1969).
37. See US Const, Art I, S 3, cl 1; De Pauw, ed, 1 Documentary History at 86, 135,
181, 189, 318, 324-25, 327, 341, 385, 387-88, 449-50, 456 (cited in note 1) (tiebreaking
votes, including the crucial bill acknowledging the President's authority to remove the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs); De Pauw, ed, 9 Documentary History passim (cited in note
1); id at 5 ("The President [of the Senate] as usual made us two or three Speeches from
the Chair."). But see Swanstrom, The United States Senate at 255 (cited in note 24)
(arguing that Adams's intervention was generally limited to procedural matters and that,
apart from the controversy over presidential removal, he seldom attempted to influence the
Senators' votes).
38. US Const, Art I, 5 3, cl 5.
39. Before Adams took office, for example, the Senate had chosen John Langdon of
New Hampshire as President "for the sole purpose of opening and counting the votes for
President of the United States." Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 16-17. Several months later, when
Adams was briefly absent, Langdon was elected once again. Id at 59. See also Brown,
Jefferson's Manual § 313 at 131 (cited in note 26) ("His office is understood to be
determined on the Vice-President's appearing and taking the chair, or at the meeting of
the Senate after the first recess."). The temporary nature of the office prevented the
President pro tern from exercising any significant influence on legislative policy, and the
position was not coveted. See Swanstrom, The United States Senate at 257-60 (cited in
note 24).
1995]
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The constitutionally mandated presence of the President's successor at the
head of the Senate raised fears in some quarters of undue executive influence on
the legislature.4" There was nothing the Senate could do about the Vice-Presi-
dent's powers, which were plainly given to him by Article I, S 3. An important
symbolic issue was at stake, however, when Adams insisted on signing official
Senate documents as "John Adams, Vice President." "Sir," Maclay recorded
himself as saying, "we know [y]ou not as Vice President within this House. [A]s
President of the Senate only do we know you, as President of the Senate only can
[y]ou sign or authenticate any Act of that body."41 Acknowledging that Maclay
appeared to express the sentiments of a majority, Adams so far modified his
practice as to sign as both "Vice President of the United States and President of
the Senate."42 The controversy may seem trivial, but it was one of several early
efforts by the Senate to establish its independence from the executive branch.
Wholly noncontroversial at the time, in contrast, were the appointments that
have perhaps the most interest and significance for students of the Constitution
today: within a few days after they first convened, each House elected a chap-
lain.43
Under the Constitution as it then stood it might have been plausible enough
to conclude that a chaplain was an appropriate "officer" for each chamber to
select pursuant to Article I. After all, as Chief Justice Burger was to suggest
nearly two centuries later, legislators obviously needed all the help they could
get." But the practice was continued not only after Congress had proposed a
constitutional amendment forbidding the passage of any law "respecting an
establishment of religion"4" but also after the Amendment had been ratified and
had become law.46
As the Supreme Court would conclude long afterward,47 this history strong-
ly suggested that Congress itself did not understand the appointment of chaplains
to offend the Amendment it had proposed. It is true that Congress might have
overlooked the possible inconsistency, that the legislators were not the ultimate
judges of the meaning of their handiwork, and that the states rather than
40. Both Gerry and George Mason had objected in the Convention on this ground. As
Gerry put it, "[w]e might as well put the President himself at the head of the Legisla-
ture." Max Farrand, ed, 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 536-37 (Yale,
2d ed 1937). See also George H. Haynes, 1 The Senate of the United States 204 (Russell
& Russell, 1960) (noting "the obvious violence which even this assignment did to the
theory of the separation of powers").
41. De Pauw, ed, 9 Documentary History at 43 (cited in note 1).
42. See id; De Pauw, ed, 6 Documentary History at 1609 (cited in note 1).
43. See Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 19, 24 (cited in note 1) (Senate); id at 242 (House).
44. Wallace v Jaffree, 472 US 38, 85 (1985) (Burger dissenting). On the other hand,
nobody seemed to think it appropriate to appoint doctors or lawyers to tend to the
legislators' medical or legal needs; tradition may well account for the distinction.
45. US Const, Amend I.
46. See Gales, ed, 3 Annals at 606 (cited in note 1) (Senate); id at 669 (House). See
also Swanstrom, The United States Senate at 185-86 (cited in note 24).
47. Marsh v Chambers, 463 US 783, 786-88 (1983).
2:161
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Congress had given the Amendment the force of law. 48 It is also true that the
literal terms of the Amendment did not apply, because in appointing chaplains
Congress had passed no "law." But it seems unlikely that the framers of the
Establishment Clause would have meant to permit each House to do by separate
resolution that which they were forbidden to do jointly; the most probable in-
ference seems to be that at the time nobody considered the mere appointment of
chaplains to be an "establishment" of religion.
The possible implications of this understanding far transcend the piddling
question of legislative chaplains. It has since become standard learning that the
Establishment Clause forbids any public measure whose purpose or primary ef-
fect is religious or which fosters "an excessive government entanglement with
religion." 4' The congressional decision with respect to chaplains seems to
contradict this test on all three points, thus calling into question a number of
subsequent Supreme Court holdings on such matters as school prayers and aid
to parochial schools.s So does the resolution adopted by both Houses at the
end of their very first session, calling on the President (as he did) to "recommend
to the people of the United States a day of public thanksgiving and prayer" on
which to acknowledge "the many and signal favors of Almighty God.... ,51
The original understanding thus appears to have been that the Amendment did
not forbid public endorsement of religion as such but only establishment as it
had existed in England and in some of the states: the creation of a single official
church.
D. OATHs
Another constitutional issue of considerable jurisprudential significance was
raised when the First Congress confronted the humble problem of how to
comply with Article VI's requirement that its members be "bound by Oath or
Affirmation to support this Constitution,"' 2 for Article VI said nothing about
how or when the oath should be administered. 3
48. See id at 813-17 (Brennan dissenting).
49. Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 US 602, 612-13 (1971), citing Walz v Tax Comm'n, 397
US 664, 676 (1970).
50. See, for example, Engel v Vitale, 370 US 421 (1962) (holding that the state cannot
compose prayers to be read aloud in public schools); Meek v Pittenger, 421 US 349
(1975) (holding that the state cannot provide educational equipment other than books to
parochial schools). See also David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The
Second Century, 1888-1986 411, 531 (Chicago, 1990).
51. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 92 (cited in note 1). For President Washington's resulting
proclamation, see James D. Richardson, 1 A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of
the Presidents 64 (Cong, 1900).
52. US Const, Art VI, cl 3.
53. Contrast US Const, Art II, 5 1, cl 8, which spells out the precise terms of the
oath required of the President "[b]efore he enter on the Execution of his Office." This
oath was administered to Washington by the Chancellor of New York before a joint
session of Congress in the Senate Chamber. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 26-27 (cited in note
1). None of the latter details was prescribed by Article II.
199s1
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Five days after achieving a quorum, the House adopted a resolution spelling
out the form of the oath to be taken by its members. 4 Two days later, at the
House's request, the Chief Justice of New York administered the oath in the
form the resolution had prescribed."5
So far, so good; if the constitutional provision was to take effect, someone
had to figure out the details of its implementation, and it made sense to conclude
that the bodies to whose officers the requirement applied had implicit authority
to do so-especially in light of the general rulemaking authority given to each
House by Article I, § 5. At the same time it prescribed the form of the oath by
resolution; however, the House appointed a committee to draft legislation on the
same subject.s6
Insofar as legislators and legislative employees were concerned, such a statute
could be explained as necessary and proper to the exercise of congressional
powers, since neither members nor staff could function without taking the oath.
Nor could there have been any constitutional objection to regulating the oath
that Article VI required of federal executive and judicial officers, as the bill also
did as it emerged from the House5 7-- for the Necessary and Proper Clause
empowered Congress to enact legislation carrying into effect not only its own
powers but also those vested in any other federal officer or department, and the
regulation was as necessary for other officials as for members of Congress
themselves.
The difficulty arose when the Senate amended the bill to prescribe the details
of the oath to be taken by state officers, who were also subject to the require-
ment of Article VI. It was Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts who raised the
constitutional objection when the bill returned to the House, and it was a good
one." No clause of the Constitution, he argued, gave Congress authority to
regulate the oath to be taken by state officers. It was therefore up to the states
themselves to do so, and if they did not, federal judges would annul their acts for
want of constitutional authority to adopt them. 9
John Laurance of New York replied that Congress had power to make "all
laws necessary or proper to carry the declarations of the constitution into effect"
54. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 101.
55. Id at 106.
56. Id at 101.
57. De Pauw, ed, 6 Documentary History at 1611-13 (cited in note 1).
58. Maclay, joined by Ellsworth, had made similar arguments in the Senate, and Madi-
son expressed doubts in the House. See De Pauw, ed, 9 Documentary History at 9-10,
21-23 (cited in note 1); De Pauw, ed, 10 Documentary History at 270-71 (cited in note
1).
59. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 277-78. Gerry seemed to think that this outcome was
ordained by the fact that the judges themselves were "bound to support the constitution."
Id at 278. This was not only one of the earliest congressional affirmations of judicial
review of both executive and legislative state action, but its rationale was broad enough
to embrace federal action as well. Furthermore, its bottom line was surprisingly draconian;
the Supreme Court never invalidated the acts of state legislatures on the ground that they
had been unconstitutionally apportioned.
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and thus to implement Article VI,6' but he was mistaken. As Gerry had already
noted, Article I spoke only of laws needed to carry out the powers vested in
some federal body.6" New Jersey's Elias Boudinot had a better justification:
The constitution said only that the officers of Government should be bound
by oath, leaving to Congress to say what oath. In short it was the duty of
the House... to detail the general principles laid down in the constitution,
and reduce them to practice.'2
In other words, Article VI itself implicitly authorized Congress to implement its
provisions.
This was not a necessary conclusion. The principle that had justified the
House in prescribing the form of the oath for its own personnel would have
justified the states in doing the same for theirs. Indeed, Article IV's explicit
provision authorizing Congress to effectuate the Full Faith and Credit Clause63
arguably strengthens the inference that when the Framers wanted Congress to
implement constitutional provisions, they said so. On the other hand, as Chief
Justice Marshall would later tell us, the last thing the Necessary and Proper
Clause was meant to do was to limit the authority implicit in other constitutional
provisions." Like the sweeping clause itself, the power to flesh out full faith
and credit may have been inserted out of an abundance of caution.
In any event, the statute as enacted regulated the oath to be taken by state
as well as federal officers.6s Four years later this action served as precedent for
the far more significant Fugitive Slave Act,6" which implemented a clause of
Article IV that was as silent with respect to congressional authority as the oath
provision of Article VI. It was in the emotionally charged context of fugitive
slaves that the Supreme Court would ultimately accept Boudinot's argument of
implied authority in the great case of Prigg v Pennsylvania.67
60. Id at 280.
61. Id at 277.
62. Id at 282.
63. US Const, Art IV, § 1.
64. McCullocb v Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheat) 316, 420 (1819).
65. Act of June 1, 1789, 1 Stat 23-24.
66. 1 Stat at 302.
67. 41 US 539 (1842); see also David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme
Court: The First Hundred Years, 1789-1888 241-46 (Chicago, 1985). Although the issue
was not explicitly debated, the oath controversy was also a precedent of sorts for a
second constitutional problem raised by the 1793 statute providing for the return of fugi-
tives, since the later statute expressly imposed duties on state officers to apprehend and
return them. 1 Stat at 302. By directing state officers to take a particular oath, the earlier
law appeared to reflect the conviction that there was no barrier to its imposing duties on
state officers if the regulation was otherwise within congressional power. Many years later
the Supreme Court would find the imposition of such duties an infringement of implicit
state sovereignty by analogy to the immunity principle of McCullocb, 17 US at 316.
Kentucky v Dennison, 65 US (24 How) 66 (1860); Currie, The First Hundred Years at
245-47 (cited in this note). More recently, with the fading of implicit immunities of all
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E. INSTRUCTIONS
From the beginning, members of the House were elected by the people
themselves." Members of the Senate, on the other hand, were chosen by state
legislatures,69 and it was soon suggested that they were mere agents subject to
the instructions of those who had sent them. Maclay recorded in 1790 that
South Carolina had instructed its Senators how to vote on the assumption of
state debts, and he published an article urging other legislatures to follow this
example. 7' The next year, when Virginia Senators relied on legislative instruc-
tions in moving once again to open Senate proceedings to the public, Oliver
Ellsworth, Robert Morris, and South Carolina's Ralph Izard protested.71 The
States had no more power to instruct Senators, Izard insisted, than electors had
to instruct the President of the United States. 72
Additional light was cast on this problem when South Carolina Representa-
tive Thomas Tucker proposed a constitutional amendment guaranteeing the
people the right "to instruct their Representatives."73 Various speakers adverted
with considerable force to the logistical difficulties involved in determining the
sense of the people on particular issues. Others raised the more fundamental
objection that binding instructions were inconsistent with the very idea of a
deliberative body, and the proposal was roundly defeated.74
There is less difficulty, of course, in ascertaining the views of a state legisla-
ture than those of the population at large. Moreover, there are countries in
which federal legislative issues are effectively debated and passed upon by bodies
whose members are directly responsible to constituent statesS-as members of
kinds, the Court has changed its mind. Puerto Rico v Branstad, 483 US 219, 230 (1987)
(expressly overruling Dennison).
68. US Const, Art I, S 2, cl 1.
69. Id, 5 3, cl 1.
70. De Pauw, ed, 9 Documentary History at 199, 219 (cited in note 1). Several states
did as Maclay advised. Swanstrom, The United States Senate at 162-71 (cited in note 24).
North Carolina's first Senators, however, defied their instructions on the ground that they
were independent once elected, and Maclay's own legislature refused even to express
opinions on issues pending before the Senate on the ground that state assemblies had no
part to play in federal legislation. Id. In the House, both Madison and William Smith of
South Carolina indicated they understood Senators to be subject to state instructions.
Gales, ed, 2 Annals at 1904, 1913 (cited in note 1).
71. De Pauw, ed, 9 Documentary History at 388-89 (cited in note 1).
72. Id at 388.
73. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 761 (cited in note 1). South Carolina's House of Repre-
sentatives had attempted to instruct the state's representatives as well as its Senators to
support federal assumption of state debts. George C. Rogers, Jr., ed, The Letters of Wil-
liam Loughton Smith to Edward Rutledge, 69 SC Hist Mag 1, 111 (1968). Smith reported
that Tucker, while willing to vote in accordance with the legislature's request, denied its
right to bind him. Id. The resolution of the South Carolina House appears in id at 105
n 18.
74. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 761-76. The vote against Tucker's amendment was forty-one
to ten. Id at 776.
75. See, for example, Articles 50-51 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Get-
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Congress were under the Articles of Confederation. 7 Thus it was entirely
plausible to argue that state election of Senators had been designed to preserve
the tradition of a state check upon federal action7 -- even though the significant
provision of the Articles permitting the states to recall their delegates had been
conspicuously omitted from the new Constitution.8
The issue of state instructions to Senators was therefore both difficult and of
transcendent importance. For better or worse, the question was never definitively
resolved. It simmered for more than a century, only to be mooted in 1913 by the
Seventeenth Amendment's provision that Senators too should be elected directly
"by the people"79-a revision that was prompted by the desire for greater
democracy but that profoundly altered the balance of power in our federal sys-
tem.
E QUALIFICATIONS
"Each House," says Article I, 5 5, "shall be the Judge of the Elections,
Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members."" Later events have con-
firmed that this clause poses a risk of arbitrary action against individual legisla-
tors,"' but, like the immunity provisions of the following section," it serves to
guarantee the independence of Congress as a whole. Before it had sat for a
month, the House of Representatives was called upon to act under this provi-
sion. 3
William Smith, elected as a Representative from South Carolina, had been
born there before the Revolution. 4 Having gone abroad to study, he was
prevented by the war from returning until 1783." It was argued that when
many, under which a body composed of state executive officers plays a significant role in
the enactment and enforcement of federal laws. For more details, see David P. Currie, The
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany ch 2 (Chicago, 1994).
76. See Art of Confed, Art V ("[A] power reserved to each state, to recall its
delegates, or any of them, at any time within the year, and to send others in their stead,
for the remainder of the Year.").
77. See Swanstrom, The United States Senate at 160-61 (cited in note 24). Both Rufus
King and John Jay had affirmed the state legislatures' right to instruct Senators during the
state ratifying conventions. See Jonathan Elliot, 2 The Debates in the Several State
Conventions 47, 283 (2d ed 1836).
78. See note 76.
79. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Swanstrom, The United States Senate
at 154-72 (cited in note 24).
80. US Const, Art I, S 5, cl 3.
81. See Powell v McCormack, 395 US 486 (1969) (giving the clause a narrow inter-
pretation to minimize this danger).
82. See US Const, Art I, S 6, cl 1 (limited freedom from arrest and immunity for "any
Speech or Debate in either House").
83. See Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 149, 175, 342-43, 412-25 (cited in note 1). A more
complete report of this proceeding appears in M. St. Clair Clarke and David A. Hall,
Cases of Contested Elections in Congress 23-37 (Gales and Seaton, 1834).
84. Clarke and Hall, Contested Elections at 26 (cited in note 83).
85. Id.
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elected to the House in 1788 he had not been "seven Years a Citizen of the
United States," as Article I, § 2 required. 6
The issue of who was a citizen of the United States was later to divide both
the Supreme Court and the country, 7 and the Constitution did not define the
term.8 ' The members who spoke expressed a variety of views. Smith himself ar-
gued that South Carolina law made him a United States citizen, 9 and Richard
Bland Lee of Virginia agreed."0 James Jackson of Georgia, concerned lest the
children of Tory loyalists be held citizens, refused to vote without proof that
Smith had left South Carolina with the blessing of the state.9
James Madison, then a Representative from Virginia, offered the most
interesting observations. State law was determinative, he argued, to the extent it
could be ascertained. 2 When state law did not afford an explicit answei; the
House "must be guided by principles of a general nature. " " Citizenship gener-
ally depended upon place of birth, and Smith had been born to South Carolina
settlers in South Carolina.94 When a colony became independent, the allegiance
of its citizens was transferred to the new state, wherever they might be; and "[s]o
far as we can judge" these general principles were in accord with South Carolina
law."5
Only one Representative voted to deny Mr. Smith his seat.9" We do not
know how many of his supporters were persuaded by Smith himself and how
many by Madison, but the episode gave significant support both to the position
that citizenship was based upon birthplace and that at least before 1789 it
depended upon state law.
G. ELECTIONS
Representative Smith did not contest the statement of facts in the petition
86. Id at 23; Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 149 (cited in note 1).
87. See Dred Scott v Sandford, 60 US (19 How) 393 (1857).
88. The Fourteenth Amendment has since done so: "All persons born or naturalized
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside." US Const, Amend XIV.
89. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 413-18. For a fuller statement of the facts, see De Pauw,
ed, 10 Documentary History at 765-72 (cited in note 1).
90. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 418-19. Smith reported that in private conversation
Boudinot had insisted that the question was one of "civil Law" with which state law had
nothing to do but that he had abandoned that position on finding "that the House were
of a different opinion." See Rogers, 69 SC Hist Mag at 3 (cited in note 73).
91. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 423-24.
92. Id at 420.
93. Id.
94. Id at 421.
95. Id at 422-23.
96. See id at 425. The dissenter was Jonathan Grout of Massachusetts, who apparently
said nothing on this issue in debate-as he generally did on other issues as well. Compare
David P. Currie, The Most Insignificant Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, 50 U Chi L Rev
466 (1983).
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challenging his eligibility, 7 and the House determined his case in plenary ses-
sion.98 The very next day, however, when the entire New Jersey delegation was
challenged on the basis of alleged irregularities in election procedure, a commit-
tee was appointed to take evidence and "report to the House all such facts as
shall arise from the proofs and allegations of the respective parties." 9
The committee in turn reported that it could not complete its task without
the testimony of absent witnesses and that some of the petitioners had asked to
be heard by counsel. 100 Various members spoke on each side of the counsel
question without detailing their reasons, and the request was ultimately with-
drawn. 101
More basic was the question of what to do about absent witnesses. Fisher
Ames of Massachusetts urged that judges of the New Jersey state courts be
commissioned to take evidence on behalf of the House in order to avoid the
inconvenience of bringing the witnesses to New York. 2 Boudinot, who was
one of the challenged members, argued that this procedure would effectively
deprive other parties of the right of cross-examination and require decision on a
cold record. 3 New Hampshire's Samuel Livermore, on the same side, contend-
ed that the clause making the House "judge" of its members' elections required
it to hear all the evidence itself.1°4 Laurance, on the other hand, argued that the
power to judge implied authority to "determine in what manner the investigation
of such a subject shall be prosecuted."105
After this discussion, the reporter observes, it grew late, and the House
97. See Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 413 (cited in note 1). Nevertheless both Laurance and
Boudinot argued the case should be sent back to committee for further sifting of the evi-
dence, in order to avoid burdening the House as a whole. See De Pauw, ed, 10 Documen-
tary History at 764-65 (cited in note 1); Clarke and Hall, Contested Elections at 24-25
(cited in note 83).
98. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 425.
99. Id. This case is reported in Clarke and Hall, Contested Elections at 38-44. For the
facts underlying the challenge, see George Adams Boyd, Elias Boudinot: Patriot and
Statesman 1740-1821 154-55 (Princeton, 1952).
100. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 663.
101. Id at 663-67. "[Mr. Page] said, if the jurisdiction of the House was questioned, the
parties had an indubitable right to be heard by counsel, and he hoped no gentleman
would refuse the people of the United States a privilege of this important nature, which
had been always enjoyed by the subjects of Great Britain." Id at 667. He did not say he
found this right anywhere in the Constitution, but he did not seem to consider it a matter
of legislative grace. Id.
102. Id at 664-65.
103. Id at 664.
104. Id at 666-67. Livermore and Thatcher had made the same argument in opposing
recommitment of the challenge to Rep. Smith. See De Pauw, ed, 10 Documentary History
at 765 (cited in note 1); Clarke and Hall, Contested Elections at 24-25 (cited in note 83).
105. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 665. Lee argued that "the whole business" should be left
to a committee in accordance with the practice of the British House of Commons because
"the example of so old and so experienced a legislative body could be followed with
safety and propriety." Id at 666.
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adjourned."6 The next entry, over a month later, informs us of a second
committee report making certain findings of fact. 11 7 After considering this
report, and after hearing speeches by Smith and Laurance for and against the
validity of the election, the House determined that the challenged Representatives
had been duly elected.' 8
The controversy over the New Jersey representatives thus raised a number of
interesting constitutional questions regarding election contests-from the power
to delegate responsibility and to gather evidence to the authority to co-opt state
officers and the rights of parties to cross-examination and counsel. The sketchy
record makes it difficult to say whether the House resolved any of these ques-
tions beyond concluding that it could employ a committee to report on the facts,
but there was much force to Laurance's observation that, even apart from the
House's express authority to adopt rules to govern its proceedings, a good deal
of discretion in how to find facts was implicit in the provision making each
House the judge of its members' elections.
H. ENUMERATION
The New Jersey controversy concerned only the manner of investigation; the
Constitution left no doubt that House elections were an appropriate subject for
House inquiry. A more basic question regarding the extent of congressional
authority to acquire information arose when Congress turned to implementing
the command of Article I, S 2, that a census be taken within three years after its
first meeting.
In contrast to the oath requirement of Article VI, the census provision
explicitly provided for congressional implementation: the enumeration was to be
made "in such Manner as [Congress] shall by Law direct."' °9 The interesting
question was the permissible scope of the information that was to be obtained.
The purpose of the enumeration, according to Article I, was to provide the
basis for apportioning both congressional seats and direct taxes among the states
"according to their respective Numbers."'".° Those numbers, the Constitution
further provided, were to be determined by counting the number of "free
Persons," excluding "Indians not taxed," and adding "three-fifths of all other
persons"-that is, of the slaves."' As enacted, however, the census bill required
that the population be further broken down by sex and by age-although neither
of these characteristics was relevant to the purposes for which the Constitution
106. Id at 667.
107. Id at 785-86.
108. Id at 866-67; see also De Pauw, ed, 11 Documentary History at 1394-99 (cited
in note 1).
109. US Const, Art 1, 5 2, cl 3.
110. Id.
111. Id. See also US Const, Art I, 5 9, cl 4 ("No capitation, or other direct, Tax shall
be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be
taken.").
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required the enumeration to be made."' Indeed, at one point the bill had been
even broader, requiring the census-takers to classify the population by occu-
pation as well."' This requirement was later deleted, but both the earlier ver-
sion and the statute itself raised the question of whether Congress was not
seeking more information than it had any right to demand.
It was the ubiquitous Madison who had promoted the idea of a census of
occupations, and he had waxed enthusiastic over the utility of the information
it would produce.114 Several members objected, arguing among other things
that the inquiry would serve no legitimate purpose and might lead the public to
suspect ulterior congressional designs. 5
Commendably, Madison made no effort to defend his additional questions
on the basis of the census provision. His position was that knowledge of individ-
ual occupations would be useful to Congress in devising later substantive legis-
lation:
I take it, sir, that in order to accommodate our laws to the real situation of
our constituents, we ought to be acquainted with that situation .... If
gentlemen have any doubts with respect to [the] utility [of this informa-
tion], I cannot satisfy them in a better manner, than by referring them to
the debates which took place upon the bills intended collaterally to benefit
the agricultural, commercial, and manufacturing parts of the community.
Did they not wish then to know the relative proportion of each, and the
exact number of every division, in order that they might rest their argu-
ments on facts, instead of assertions and conjectures? Will any gentleman
pretend to doubt but our regulations would have been better accommodat-
ed to the real state of the society than they are?...
In short, the information that went beyond what was required for the apportion-
ment of representatives and taxes was necessary and proper to the informed
enactment of legislation on various subjects within the express authority of Con-
gress.
Similar arguments were later to support a broad power of congressional
investigation." 7 The inclusion of questions concerning age and sex in the origi-
nal census suggests that Congress was already persuaded by the essence of
Madison's position."
112. Act of March 1, 1790, 1 Stat 101.
113. See Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 114547 (cited in note 1).
114. See Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 1115, 114546.
115. See id at 114547 (Remarks of Reps. Livermore and Page); Hobson, et al, eds, 13
Madison Papers at 9 (cited in note 34) (Rep. White).
116. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 1146. See also id at 1115.
117. McGrain v Daugberty, 273 US 135 (1927); Currie, The Second Century at 198
(cited in note 50).
118. Madison did suggest that Congress ought not to inquire as to persons "who are
employed in teaching and inculcating the duties of religion" because "the General
Government is proscribed from interfering, in any manner whatever, in matters respecting
religion; and it may be thought to do this, in ascertaining who [are], and who are not
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I. INVESTIGATION
Another question of the extent of congressional powers of inquiry arose soon
after the enumeration controversy when Senator Robert Morris of Pennsylvania
asked that commissioners be appointed to investigate his own conduct as Super-
intendent of Finance under the Confederation." 9 The Senate sidestepped the
constitutional problem by passing a resolution requesting the President to
appoint commissioners for the purpose.' 20 In the House, however,
Connecticut's Roger Sherman provoked a minor storm by moving to refer the
investigation to a committee of five members of Congress.' 2'
Gerry at once protested on constitutional grounds." Unlike the Confedera-
tion Congress, he argued, the new House had only legislative powers; short of
impeachment, supervision of executive conduct was an executive matter entrust-
ed exclusively to the President.' Madison replied that the House had the right
to "possess itself of the fullest information in order to doing justice to the
country and to public officers," and the committee was appointed.'24 Thus
within a year of its first meeting, in the face of an explicit constitutional chal-
lenge, the House of Representatives flatly asserted a broad power to investigate
the conduct of a former executive in order to do "justice" to the officer and to
the country as a whole.
No such authority, of course, was expressly given to either House. It had
been easy enough to find authority to gather relevant information implicit in the
powers to legislate and to resolve election disputes, and Gerry's argument
reminds us that it was fairly implicit in the impeachment power, too.' 5 But
neither Madison nor anyone else suggested that the investigation of Morris was
relevant to an election contest, to an impeachment, or to any prospective legis-
ministers of the Gospel." Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 1146 (cited in note 1). Not only does
this passage reflect a healthy recognition that the power of investigation was limited to
matters of legitimate legislative concern, it also suggests a rather strict notion of what it
meant to pass laws "respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof." US Const, Amend I.
119. See Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 1168; Gales, ed, 2 Annals at 2168-70 (cited in note 1).
120. See Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 1233. Maclay thought the whole business a sleazy effort
by Morris to divert attention from his personal financial difficulties by focusing on his un-
challenged public accounts, but he raised no constitutional objections to this procedure. See
De Pauw, ed, 9 Documentary History at 199 (cited in note 1).
121. Gales, ed, 2 Annals at 1514.
122. Id at 1515.
123. Id.
124. See id at 1514-15. The Committee's report, filed nearly a year later, id at 2017,
recited that it was "impossible" to examine Morris's accounts in detail, enclosed copies of
relevant documents for the members to peruse, and refrained from any commentary on the
propriety of the conduct it had been appointed to explore. Hobson, et al, eds, 13
Madison Papers at 392-93 (cited in note 34).
125. See US Const, Art I, S 2, cl 5 ("The House of Representatives ...shall have the
sole Power of Impeachment.").
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lation,125 although the last argument could easily have been made. 27 Many
years later the Supreme Court would convincingly conclude that "doing justice"
was not enough to justify congressional inquiry; investigations designed simply
to determine the existence of past wrongdoing were not ancillary to any legit-
imate congressional function."'
II. The Special Role of the Senate
Apart from impeachment, the functions of the House of Representatives were
restricted to those incident to legislation and to the quasi-legislative process of
constitutional amendment. The Senate, on the other hand, was given a role to
play in two important functions otherwise entrusted to the executive: the
appointment of officers and the making of treaties. Article II, S 2 empowered the
President to make both appointments and treaties "by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate"-requiring a two-thirds majority in the latter case."
On May 25, 1789, as the reporter informs us, the Senate "for the first time,
entered upon executive business" as it acknowledged the receipt of a communica-
tion from President Washington enclosing two Indian treaties concluded at Fort
Harmar in January and an explanatory statement by War Secretary Henry
Knox.13 A few weeks later, after what seems to have been a prolonged exami-
nation of the "fimess" of the nominee, the Senate consented to the appointment
of William Short as charge d'affaires in France during the absence of the Minis-
ter, Thomas Jefferson.1 31
Having thus moistened their toes, the President and the Senate rolled up their
cuffs and waded into the task of defining their respective roles with respect to
executive affairs. 32
126. No impeachment inquiry had been instituted, and the likelihood of any such
proceeding was reduced by the fact that Morris was no longer in office. Nor was there
any suggestion that integrity was a qualification for election to the Senate or that Morris's
conduct justified his expulsion under Article I, S 5, cl 2.
127. An understanding of past practices might well have led to new regulations designed
to protect against the future abuse of authority. See Philip B. Kurland, Watergate and the
Constitution 20-23 (Chicago, 1978).
128. Kilbourn v Thompson, 103 US 168 (1881); Currie, The First Hundred Years at
436-38 (cited in note 67).
129. US Const, Art II, 5 2, cl 2. Recognizing the distinct nature of these functions, the
Senate kept its records of appointment and treaty matters in a separate Executive Journal,
and executive matters were excluded from the 1794 resolution otherwise admitting the
public to Senate deliberations, apparently on grounds of confidentiality. See Gales, ed, 1
Annals at 15 (cited in note 1).
130. See Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 40-42. Knox, who had not yet been appointed Secretary
of War under the new Constitution, was serving in that capacity by virtue of an appoint-
ment by the Confederation Congress. He was renominated on September 11, 1789, and
confirmed the next day. Id at 80, 81.
131. See De Pauw, ed, 2 Documentary History at 8-9 (cited in note 1); Gales, ed, 1
Annals at 47. Jefferson's aim was to spend a short time at home for rest and recreation.
On September 26 he was nominated to be Secretary of State, and the Senate immediately
confirmed. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 93.
132. "Before its final adjournment was reached, the twilight zone in which lie the
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A. THE FRENCH CONSULAR CONVENTION
On July 21, the Senate requested John Jay, who as Secretary of Foreign
Affairs under the Confederation was still in office, to appear and inform the
Senators about a consular agreement that Jefferson had concluded with France
in November, 1788.' The Secretary appeared and argued that the treaty
should be approved.' The Senators agreed, unanimously resolving "[t]hat the
Senate do consent to the said convention, and advise the President of the United
States to ratify the same."13S
This episode passed without recorded friction, but it set several interesting
precedents. First, like the Indian treaties that still lay on the table, the consular
agreement had been concluded before the first meeting of the new Congress;
both the President and the Senate assumed that the advice and consent provision
nevertheless applied. Second, the Senate explicitly gave advice as well as consent,
imparting not only its own imprimatur but also an unequivocal suggestion as to
how the President should exercise his authority to perform the distinct act of
final ratification. The form of the resolution thus illustrates both the imprecision
of the common reference to Senate "ratification" of treaties and the original
understanding that the President retained discretion to withhold ratification after
the Senate had given its consent."'
Finally, the consular incident demonstrates that the Senate understandably
interpreted its treaty responsibilities to give it implicit power to acquire the
information needed for the intelligent exercise of those responsibilities and to
confer in person with executive officers in order to obtain it.'37 Indeed, al-
though the order respecting Jay's appearance was cautiously phrased as a
"request[]," 3 the cruder terms employed a few days earlier in "orderling]"
that the Secretary furnish copies of relevant documents and report on the
accuracy of a translation 39 appeared to assert the additional right to employ
compulsory process against a high executive official. Nevertheless, the failure of
either Jay or Washington to raise any objection based upon executive privilege
Senate's so-called executive powers had been rather thoroughly explored and tentatively
charted." Haynes, 1 Senate of the United States at 77 (cited in note 40).
133. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 52 (cited in note 1). The treaty itself appears in Act of
November 14, 1788, 8 Stat 106.
134. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 54-55.
135. Id at 55.
136. See Quincy Wright, The Control of American Foreign Relations 254 (MacMillan,
1922); Haynes, 2 Senate of the United States at 637-39 (cited in note 40).
137. "This direct and personal intercourse between the executive and the Senate is an
indication of the feeling which seems to have been prevalent that the latter really was a
council of advice upon treaties and appointments-a council which expected to discuss
these matters directly with the other branch of the government." Ralston Hayden, The
Senate and Treaties, 1789-1817 6 (MacMillan, 1920).
138. De Pauw, ed, 2 Documentary History at 10 (cited in note 1).
139. Id at 9.
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cannot be taken to concede this important principle, since the President had
directed the Secretary in advance to provide "whatever official Papers and infor-
mation on the subject" the Senate might require. 141
B. THE FISHBOURN AFFAIR
A real ruckus erupted a few days later, however, when the Senate without
recorded explanation rejected the nomination of Benjamin Fishbourn for the
position of naval officer for the port of Savannah under the tariff law.
141
Washington went up in flames:
Whatever may have been the reasons which induced your dissent, I am
persuaded they were such as you deemed sufficient. Permit me to submit to
your consideration whether, on occasions where the propriety of nomina-
tions appear [sic] questionable to you, it would not be expedient to com-
municate that circumstance to me, and thereby avail yourselves of the
information which led me to make them, and which I would with pleasure
lay before you.142
While bowing to the Senate's decision by nominating a substitute, the President
went on to extol the virtues of his vanquished champion in an effort "to show
that such a mode of proceeding" as he was suggesting "might be useful."
1 43
Equally aware of the need for improved procedure, the Senate, without
waiting for Washington's reaction, had appointed a committee to confer with
him "on the mode of communication proper to be pursued between him and the
Senate" in appointment and treaty matters, and a motion had been introduced
to declare it "the opinion of the Senate that their advice, and consent to the
appointment of Officers should be given in the presence of the President."
14
Making clear his own preference for written communications with respect to ap-
140. Id at 7.
141. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 60 (cited in note 1); De Pauw, ed, 2 Documentary History
at 23-24 (cited in note 1). Fishbourn was one of 102 individuals nominated at the same
time for various customs offices, and he was the only one to be rejected. Gales, ed, 1
Annals at 56-57, 61-62; De Pauw, ed, 2 Documentary History at 13-23.
142. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 61.
143. Id. To hear the President tell it, Fishbourn was highly qualified, having served his
state as legislator, executive councilor, militia officer, and customs agent after fighting
bravely under Washington himself during the Revolution. On the hypothesis that the
nominee had somehow aroused the enmity of one or both of Georgia's own Senators, the
episode has been cited as the first instance of the questionable practice that came to be
known as senatorial courtesy; but there appears to be little evidence to support the
hypothesis. See, for example, Haynes, 1 Senate of the United States at 54 (cited in note
40); Haynes, 2 Senate of the United States at 736-37 (cited in note 40) (repeating the
suggestion); James Hart, The American Presidency in Action 1789 123-25 (MacMillan,
1948) (questioning it); Swanstrom, The United States Senate at 102-03 (cited in note 24)
(summarizing the debate). The nomination of Fishbourn's replacement was confirmed on
the day it was received. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 62.
144. De Pauw, ed, 2 Documentary History at 24 (cited in note 1).
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pointments lest his presence inhibit free discussion by the Senate, Washington
told the committee he favored a flexible arrangement permitting communications
in a variety of forms and forums as circumstances might require. 4
On the strength of these consultations the Senate adopted a resolution
expressly contemplating both written nominations and meetings with the
President at any place he might select. If the President chose to come to the
Senate Chamber, he would sit in the Vice-President's chair; but, the Vice-Presi-
dent would still "be considered as at the head of the Senate" and most signifi-
cantly would put all the questions, "either in the presence or absence of the
President of the United States."14 Thus once again the Senators insisted on
asserting their independence: if the President elected to seek their advice in per-
son, they were determined not to lose control of the proceeding.
C. THE SOUTHERN INDIANS
President Washington never took advantage of the opportunity to submit
nominations in person,'47 but on the very day the resolution was adopted he
peremptorily informed the Senators that he would meet them in their chamber
at 11:30 the next morning "to advise with them on the terms of the treaty to be
negotiated with the Southern Indians."'45 He appeared as scheduled with Secre-
tary Knox in tow and laid before the Senate a detailed written statement of facts
and questions in which he solicited the Senate's advice on what position to take
in the coming negotiations.149
This intricate document was read aloud twice over the din of passing
carriages, i"' and then Vice-President Adams began to ask for yes or no answers
to the questions the President had posed. Maclay rose to object: "the business is
new to the Senate, it is of importance, it is our duty to inform ourselves as well
as possible on the Subject."' 5' When he moved to refer the questions to a
committee for that purpose, Washington "started up in a [v]iolent fret" and re-
monstrated that "[t]his defeats every purpose of my coming here." 1 12 Ultimate-
ly, however, he agreed to postpone the remaining consultation until the following
145. See id at 29; John Fitzpatrick, 30 The Writings of George Washington 373-79
(GPO, 1939).
146. See Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 66-67 (cited in note 1); De Pauw, ed, 2 Documentary
History at 29-30.
147. See Swanstrom, The United States Senate at 98 (cited in note 24).
148. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 67; De Pauw, ed, 2 Documentary History at 30. The
President had already suggested the creation of a commission to negotiate with the
Southern Indians. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 60. A statute had been passed to provide for its
expenses, Act of August 20, 1789, 1 Stat 54, and the Senate had consented to the
appointment of the three commissioners, Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 66-67.
149. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 67-71; De Pauw, ed, 2 Documentary History at 31-34.
150. "I could tell it was something about indians," Maclay wrote after the first reading,
"but was not master of one Sentence of it." De Pauw, ed, 9 Documentary History at 128
(cited in note 1).
151. Id.
152. Id at 130.
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Monday when, after debating the merits of each question in Washington's
presence, the Senate gave him the requested advice.1
53
This famous confrontation resolved three critical questions regarding the
Senate's authority with respect to treaties. First, both the President and the
Senate plainly interpreted the power to advise and consent to include not merely
approval of the finished product but also discussion in advance of the course of
action to be pursued. The same understanding was evident the following year,
when Washington asked the Senate what he should do to resolve differences with
Great Britain over our northeastern boundary and was advised if negotiation
failed to propose that the matter be submitted to arbitration." Thus the origi-
nal understanding seems to have been that, at least with regard to treaties, the
Senate would function as a true advisory council, not simply as a check on the
arbitrary exercise of power."55 Indeed in the waning days of the First Congress,
the President went so far as to ask and the Senate to give advice as to the
meaning of an existing treaty, although this service scarcely seemed to have been
embraced within the authority to advise and consent with respect to the making
of treaties."'
153. Id at 128-32.
154. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 980, 994 (cited in note 1). See also id at 1063-64 (the
President asked and received permission to add a secret article respecting trade to the
treaty with the Creeks that was in the process of negotiation pursuant to earlier Senate
advice); id at 1072-73 (the President asked the Senate whether to enforce the existing
treaty with the Cherokees or negotiate a new one and was advised to do whichever "the
tranquillity and interest of the United States may require").
155. See Swanstrom, The United States Senate at 93 (cited in note 24); Louis Henkin,
Constitutionalism, Democracy, and Foreign Affairs 49-50 (Columbia, 1990). This is not to
suggest that the special advisory function of the Senate raised any question as to the con-
stitutionality of Washington's well-known practice of seeking advice on a variety of
matters from Representative James Madison and others, in addition to the Senate and the
heads of departments whose opinions Article II expressly empowered him to obtain. See
Swanstrom, The United States Senate at 93-95 (cited in note 24); Flexner, The New
Nation at 214 (cited in note 3); Ralph Ketcham, James Madison, A Biography 286-87,
315-17, 319-21 (MacMillan, 1971) (noting that, among other things, during the first ses-
sion of Congress, before department heads were appointed, Madison was in essence
Washington's "aide, grand vizier, and prime minister"). The Justices of the Supreme Court
were soon to invoke the Article II provision in support of their refusal to advise the
President on abstract legal questions; see the so-called "Correspondence of the Justices"
(1793), reprinted in Paul Bator, et al, Hart and Wecbsler's The Federal Courts and the
Federal System 65-67 (Foundation, 3d ed 1988), but it seems unlikely that the clauses
giving the Senate and the Cabinet particular rights and duties in this regard were meant
to deprive the President of the obvious benefits of talking to anyone else.
156. Gales, ed, 2 Annals at 1814-15 (cited in note 1). In early 1791, responding to a
presidential message asking Congress to do "what to you shall seem most expedient"
about "citizens of the United States in captivity at Algiers," id at 1783, the Senate re-
solved to "advise and consent that the President ...take such measures as he may think
necessary for the redemption" of the captives "provided the expense shall not exceed forty
thousand dollars." Id at 1795-96. Necessary "measures" to secure the release of prisoners
might of course have included a treaty, but the Senate's approval was not so limited; this
resolution too suggests the Senate may have shared Representative Sherman's expansive
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It is noteworthy that no comparable practice emerged with regard to
appointments; from the outset the President simply submitted the names and the
Senate voted yes or no."5 7 It has been suggested with some force that the text
of Article II supported this discrepancy by making clear that it was the President
alone who was to "nominate" officers; only their actual appointment required
Senate participation.' On the other side, it may be argued that this interpre-
tation gives little effect to the explicit requirement that here, as in the case of
treaties, the Senate provide the President not only with consent but with advice
as well.
Second, as seemed to follow from their shared conception of the Senate's role
as an advisory council, both parties plainly thought it appropriate for the
President to consult with the Senate in person. Even when nothing was wanted
beyond simple consent, as the Fishbourn controversy had shown, there was
ample room for misunderstanding if the matter was handled entirely in writing;
it seemed to go without saying that the flexibility of oral discussion would facili-
tate the giving of actual advice.
At the same time, however, Washington's method of seeking advice in the
case of the Southern Indians posed a patent threat to the independence of the
Senate in performing its advisory function. Washington had perceptively called
attention to the problem himself when consulted by the Senate committee as to
the proper means of communication on treaty and appointment matters."s9 If
the Senate was to participate meaningfully in the exercise, it required an oppor-
tunity both to study the President's proposals and to discuss them when the
President was not around. 6 "I saw no chance of a fair investigation," Maclay
had whispered at one point to Morris, "while the President of the U.S. sat there
with his Secretary at War, to support his Opinions and over awe the timid and
neutral part of the Senate..' 6
view that Article II required Senate participation "in every transaction which respects the
business of negotiation with foreign powers." Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 1122 (cited in note
1). For further discussion of the Algerian pirates, see Currie, 61 U Chi L Rev at 820-21
(cited in note 2).
157. See the discussion of the Short and Fishbourn nominations in text accompanying
notes 140-42. Madison, Jefferson, and Jay all advised Washington not to consult the
Senate before making nominations. John Fitzpatrick, 4 The Diaries of George Washington
122 (Houghton Mifflin, 1925), cited in Ketcham, Madison Biography at 315 (cited in note
155).
158. Swanstrom, The United States Senate at 113 (cited in note 24). See also Federalist
76 (Hamilton), in Jacob E. Cooke, ed, The Federalist 512 (Wesleyan, 1961) ("In the act
of nomination his judgment alone would be exercised.").
159. See text accompanying notes 141-43.
160. See Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and
Practices, 30 Wm & Mary L Rev 211, 226-27 (1989).
161. De Pauw, ed, 9 Documentary History at 130 (cited in note 1). "[Hie wishes Us
to see with the Eyes and hear with the ears of his Secretary only, the Secretary to
advance the Premisses the President to draw Conclusions. and to bear down our delibera-
tions with his personal Authority & Presence, form only will be left for Us - This will
not do with Americans." Id at 130-31.
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In insisting on postponing their answers until they could study the
President's inquiries on their own, the Senators assured themselves the autonomy
without which they could hardly have performed the checking function contem-
plated by Article II; and thus, the third result of the confrontation over the
Southern Indians was to resolve apparently for all time a major issue of the
balance of power between the two organs of government. The price of the
Senate's victory was high, however, for Washington responded to his procedural
defeat by resolving never to ask the Senate for advice in person again."
D. THE FORT HARMAR TREATIES
When President Washington had presented the Indian treaties concluded at
Fort Harmar to the Senate in May, he had not expressly asked for Senate
consent. He had asked for advice, however, and Knox's accompanying letter had
added that, if "the Senate of the United States should concur in their approba-
tion" of the agreements, "it might be proper that the same should be ratified and
published, with a proclamation enjoining an observance thereof." 3 On Sep-
tember 8, therefore, the Senate adopted a resolution advising the President "to
execute and enjoin an observance of" one of the two treaties in question.'"
Finding the suggestion that he "execute" the treaty ambiguous, the President
asked for legal clarification. Did the Senate mean that he should ratify the
agreement, or that he should enforce it without further ado because no rati-
fication was required? "[A]s a check on the mistakes and indiscretions of
ministers or commissioners," Washington observed, it had been the practice of
nations "not to consider any treaty negotiated and signed by such officers as
final and conclusive, until ratified by the sovereign or government from which
they derive their powers."16 He was "inclined to think it would be advisable"
162. See Swanstrom, The United States Senate at 117-18 (cited in note 24); Flexner, 3
The New Nation at 216-18 (cited in note 3). It seems a pity that the parties were unable
to agree on some means of preserving the advantages of face-to-face consultation while
avoiding ignorance and intimidation. One way out might have been for the Senators, after
discussing the matter both among themselves and with the Chief Executive, to vote by
secret ballot. They had done so for a brief time on appointments, in order, as Maclay
argued, to insulate them from fear of presidential or other reprisal. See De Pauw, ed, 9
Documentary History at 79-82 (cited in note 1). The resolution regulating the advice and
consent procedure had repudiated that option by requiring the Senators to indicate their
position viva voce. See Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 67 (cited in note 1); Swanstrom, The
United States Senate at 98-99 (cited in note 24).
163. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 42; W. W. Abbot, ed, 2 The Papers of George Washington
370-73, 391 (Virginia, 1987).
164. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 79. The treaty approved was with the "Wiandot, Delaware,
Ottawa, Chippewa, Pattawatima, and Sac Nations" and appears in Act of January 9,
1789, 7 Stat 28. The second agreement, with five of the Six Nations of the Iroquois, was
not approved until the second session out of concern lest it impair New York and
Massachusetts claims to certain lands. See Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 87,;Act of January 7,
1789; 7. Stat 33.
165. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 83 (cited in note 1). See William Prescott, 3 The History
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to adopt the same practice in dealing with Indian treaties, even though they were
made by the chiefs themselves and thus required no ratification from the Indian
side, since they were "formed on our part by the agency of subordinate offi-
cers." 6 ' Like the responsible statesman he was, Washington thought it impor-
tant "that this point should be well considered and settled, so that our national
proceedings, in this respect, may become uniform, and be directed by fixed and
stable principles.""6 7
A Senate committee appointed to draft a reply argued against formal
ratification on the ground of precedent: "[t]he signature of treaties with the
Indian nations has ever been considered as a full completion thereof," and the
Senate's earlier resolution "authorizes the President of the United States to enjoin
a due observance thereof."' 68 This apparent effort to dispense with Presidential
ratification while preserving the Senate's own veto power raised a serious issue
of consistency, for if the negotiator's signature made a treaty binding there
seemed to be no room for later Senate consent.169
Some of the thornier issues raised by this suggestion were avoided when the
Senate rejected the committee's report and embraced the President's position by
resolving to "advise and consent that the President of the United States ratify the
treaty." 7° Implicit both in this resolution and in the committee report was the
assumption that agreements with Indian tribes were "treaties" requiring Senate
approval under Article II. Washington had made the same assumption in asking
the Senate for advice about treating with the Southern Indians a few weeks
before.'7' Moreover, as Knox's letter on that occasion had indicated, Congress
had dealt with Indian nations by treaty throughout the Confederation peri-
od.'72 There was nothing in the language of Article II to suggest that either the
President's power or that of the Senate was limited to agreements with foreign
nations,7 3 and there seemed as much reason to require Senate approval in the
of the Reign of Ferdinand & Isabella The Catholic 87-91 (Little, Brown, 1838) (tracing
this practice to an unfortunate instance in which a Spanish emissary to France during their
reign had grievously abused his authority).
166. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 83.
167. Id. See Casper, 30 Wm & Mary L Rev at 260 (cited in note 160) ("Washing-
ton . . . has found few matches among later Presidents in the deliberateness with which
he worried about what was right for the government as a whole .
168. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 84.
169. Senate authority might have been reconciled with the finality of the negotiator's
action if the Senate had given its approval in advance, but that was not what had
happened. A requirement of subsequent approval by the Senate but not by the President
might have been justified on the ground that only the President had consented in advance,
but that was not what the committee said. These explanations assume either that the
President could delegate the power to make treaties or that the Senate could give its
consent in advance; and both assumptions could be disputed.
170. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 87.
171. See text accompanying notes 144-58.
172. The Indian treaties concluded under the Confederation are reported in 7 Stat 13-
27.
173. Contrast US Const, Art I, S 8, cl 3, which expressly distinguishes between com-
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one case as in the other.
The Fort Harmar controversy thus established that treaties with Indian
nations required both Senate consent and presidential ratification."' 4 Thence-
forth Indian treaties were subject to the same rules as treaties with foreign
nations, until Congress legislated to forbid the negotiation of further Indian
agreements in 1871.17
III. The Executive Branch
"The executive Power," said Article II simply, "shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America."17 There were detailed provisions for the
President's election1  and a brief description of his powers 178 -some of
which, as we have seen, he was to share with the Senate.179 There were provi-
sions for his removal by an extraordinary Senate majority after impeachment by
the House for "high Crimes and Misdemeanors"80 and for his replacement in
case the office became vacant."' Apart from prescribing the exact terms of the
oath the President was to take before entering upon his duties,"' howeve;
merce with "foreign nations" and with "the Indian tribes," only to equate them again by
empowering Congress to regulate both, and US Const, Art III, S 2, which distinguishes
between foreign states and Indian nations by extending the judicial power to certain cases
and controversies involving the former without mentioning the latter. See Cherokee Nation
v Georgia, 30 US (5 Pet) 1 (1831); Currie, The First Hundred Years at 122-25 (cited in
note 67).
174. "The circumstances in which this decision was reached reveal how both the
President and the Senate were feeling their way carefully and thoughtfully in the determi-
nation of the technique of treaty-making." Hayden, The Senate and Treaties at 12 (cited
in note 137).
175. Act of March 3, 1871, 16 Stat 544, 566. This prohibition raised interesting
constitutional questions of its own, but they belong to a later period.
176. US Const, Art II, 5 1, cl 1.
177. Id, cl 2-4.
178. Id, SS 2-3.
179. See text accompanying note 129.
180. US Const, Art I, S 2, c 5; id, S 3, cl 6; id, Art II, S 4. The Constitution did not
expressly give the President any immunity from judicial process, id, Art I, § 6, cl 1, as it
did members of Congress, id, S 3, cl 7. Nevertheless, Maclay records Ellsworth and
Adams as having argued privately that apart from impeachment all process against the
President was implicitly forbidden because it would "Stop the Whole Machine of Govern-
ment." De Pauw, ed, 9 Documentary History at 168 (cited in note 1). When Maclay put
the case of murder, the Vice-President replied that the example was unrealistic: in two
centuries there had been no instance of murder by a European head of state. This was
"very true in a retail way," Maclay noted in his diary; "they generally do these things on
the great Scale." Id.
181. US Const, Art II, § 1, cl 6. There were interesting debates in the First Congress
over a bill to provide for presidential succession in the event that both the President and
Vice-President were unable to act, but discussion will be postponed because the statute
was not enacted until 1792. See Gales, ed, 2 Annals at 1902-05, 1911-18 (cited in note
1); Act of March 1, 1792, 1 Star 239, 240.
182. US Const, Art II, § 1, cl 8.
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Article II said very little about how the President was to perform his functions.
It also said very little about the officers with whose assistance he was to perform
them.'
A. THE PRESIDENT'S ROLE IN LEGISLATION
President Washington's first official act after taking the oath prescribed by
Article II, S 1 was to deliver an inaugural address. One of the most conspicuous
features of this speech was the reticence with which he approached the duty
imposed upon him by S 3 of the same Article to "recommend to [Congress's]
Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient."
Declining to propose "particular measures," he diffidently commended to the
legislators the list of their own constitutional powers, noting specifically that it
would be up to them to determine to what extent to propose amendments to the
Constitution itself under Article V. He justified this passive attitude by reference
to "[t]he circumstances under which I now meet you," by which he seems to
have meant the fact that both he and his auditors had just entered upon their
duties.'
When Congress assembled for its second session in January, 1790, the
President came to address both Houses once again." 5 In fulfillment of his
obligation under Article II, S 3 to periodically "give to the Congress information
of the state of the Union," he congratulated the members on "the present fa-
vorable prospects of our public affairs," listed some accomplishments of the past
months, and went on to identify additional matters deserving of congressional at-
tention.'86 This time he was somewhat more specific in making recommenda-
tions for legislative action, calling attention to such matters as the organization
of the militia, the defense against Indian depredations, and the need for legisla-
tion respecting naturalization, currency, weights and measures, and the promo-
tion of learning.'87
Even on this occasion, however, he confined himself largely to suggesting
areas of concern rather than particular solutions. Apart from urging Congress to
act, as the Patent Clause expressly contemplated, to encourage invention, the
closest he came to making a specific recommendation was to toss out the rather
startling possibility of establishing a national university. Yet this suggestion too
was cautiously phrased as merely one of several options "well worthy of a place
in the deliberations of the Legislature."' 88
183. For a thorough study of the actual structure and operations of the executive
department under Washington and Adams, see White, The Federalists (cited in note 3).
184. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 27-29 (cited in note 1).
185. Id at 969-71.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id at 970. See also White, The Federalists at 54-56 (cited in note 3) ("His
messages went no further than to suggest subjects for consideration, and in no case did
they contain any indication concerning the policy which he thought Congress should pur-
sue. . . . The first Congress went through its first session without any known suggestions
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Of course it was possible for Washington to package pointed recommenda-
tions in deferential terms without disguising his own preferences, as he did in
urging the third session of the same Congress to consider "how far, and in what
mode," it might be desirable to provide "such encouragements to our own
navigation as will render our commerce and agriculture less dependent on foreign
bottoms, which may fail us in the very moments most interesting to both of these
great objects." 8' But this fictionalization of deference may have represented the
beginnings of a change of heart. For the unfeigned reticence of his initial address
seems not to have been attributable solely to the "circumstances" with which he
excused his silence on that occasion. With his usual punctiliousness, Washington
appeared at first to be afraid that concrete presidential proposals might unduly
influence an autonomous branch of government.19
Fears of excessive executive influence also crept up in Congress. After
Washington's second address, for example, Maclay complained to his diary
about the "Servile" practice by which the Senate had elected to respond immedi-
ately to each suggestion made in a presidential speech:
It was a Stale ministerial Trick in Britain, to get the Houses of parliament
to chime in with the speech, and then consider them as pledged to support
any Measure which could be grafted on the Speech. It was the Socratic
mode of Argument introduced into politicks, to entrap men into Measures
they were not aware of."'
Similarly, when the Postmaster General attached a proposed bill to a report
submitted to the House of Representatives on behalf of the President, there were
from the President.").
189. Gales, ed, 2 Annals at 1772 (cited in note 1). His position seemed no more dif-
ficult to discern when in the same speech he asked the legislators to consider whether
there might be room for improvements in the judiciary system that they had just estab-
lished "and, particularly, whether an uniform process of execution, on sentences issuing
from the federal courts, be not desirable throughout all the States." Id. See also Gales, ed,
1 Annals at 82 (requesting Congress to give the President authority to call out the militia);
id at 975 (transmitting Secretary Knox's plan for organizing the militia); Fitzpatrick, ed,
4 Washington Diaries at 60 (cited in note 145) (noting that he had sent Knox his
thoughts on the militia question so that the Secretary could put them "into the form of
a Bill").
190. See Flexner, 3 The New Nation at 221 (cited in note 3); McDonald, Washington
at 78 (cited in note 3); Hart, Presidency in Action at 55-57 (cited in note 143);
Swanstrom, The United States Senate at 260-62 (cited in note 24). According to Ralph
Ketcham, Washington's original draft of his inaugural address had contained a "detailed
legislative program" for Congress's consideration, which Madison omitted in rewriting the
address out of a concern for separation of powers. Ketcham, Madison Biography at 277-
78 (cited in note 155). As late as February, 1792, Washington wrote that "[m]otives of
delicacy" had "uniformly restrained" him "from introducing any topick which relates to
Legislative matters to members of either house of Congress, lest it should be suspected
that he wished to influence the question before it." John C. Fitzpatrick, ed, 31 The
Writings of George Washington at 493 (GPO, 1939).
191. De Pauw, ed, 9 Documentary History at 181 (cited in note 1).
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vociferous objections to its being read:
Mr. Fitzsimons thought there was a degree of indelicacy, not to say impro-
priety, in permitting the Heads of Departments to bring bills before the
House. He thought it was sufficient for them to make reports of facts, with
their opinions thereon, and leave the rest to the discretion of the Legisla-
ture.
192
Page added that "no bill ought to be read in the House that did not originate
with its leave," and the report was referred to a committee for consideration. 93
The concern for congressional autonomy was legitimate, but it did not justify
Washington's initial fastidiousness. In the two instances just cited Congress
sensibly responded, not by attempting to silence the President, but by sending
executive suggestions to committees' and by establishing that only members
could introduce bills. 19s For there was nothing wrong with the President's
making recommendations; that was what the Framers, cognizant of his opportu-
nities for perceiving problems and possible solutions, had wisely encouraged him
to do. The increasingly assertive tone of Washington's first three addresses
suggests that he was gradually coming to accept the significant advisory role that
the Constitution envisioned for him in the legislative process.,
192. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 1114 (cited in note 1).
193. Id.
194. See id at 1094-95.
195. On the other hand, when a provision in the Treasury bill that would have re-
quired the Secretary to "digest and report plans for the improvement and management of
the revenue, and the support of the public credit" was branded "a dangerous innovation
upon the constitutional privilege of this House" that would give him "an undue influence
within these walls," it was watered down so that the Secretary would merely "digest and
prepare" plans rather than report them-despite the sensible arguments of Benson and
others that advice was useful and that nothing in the bill impaired the House's right to
make the ultimate decision. Id at 616-31. Even the opponents of secretarial reports, how-
ever, had to concede that the President himself was entitled to make recommendations. See
id; Act of September 2, 1789, 1 Star 65; Casper, 30 Wm & Mary L Rev at 227-28 (cited
in note 160). For the arguments of Gerry and Tucker that secretarial reports with respect
to taxation would offend the Article I, 5 7 provision that "all bills for raising revenue,
shall originate in the house," US Const, Art I, 5 7, cl 1 (emphasis added), and the sen-
sible responses of Madison and others, see De Pauw, ed, 11 Documentary History at
1055-73 (cited in note 1).
196. Moreover, the President's reticence did not seem to be shared by his Treasury
Secretary; the plan for the national bank and payment of revolutionary debts were based
upon reports submitted by Hamilton in response to House requests. See Currie, 61 U Chi
L Rev at 802, 808-12 (cited in note 2). "It was not long," wrote Professor Corwin,
"before the ever alert suspicion of Jefferson discovered that Hamilton's connection with
Congress, whereby 'the whole action of the Legislature was ...under the direction of the
Treasury,' tended definitely to the overthrow of republican institutions." Edward S.
Corwin, The President: Office and Powers 265-66 (NYU, 1940). For the more aggressive
attitudes of Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt
toward the legislative process, see id at 267-82; for a discussion of the special relationship
between the Treasury and Congress, see text accompanying notes 271-77.
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Apart from authority to convene special sessions of Congress and to resolve
disputes between the two Houses as to the time of adjournment, 197 the
President's remaining power with respect to legislation was the significant right
to veto bills and other actions of both Houses, subject to override by a two-
thirds vote in each chamber."8 Washington vetoed no congressional action
during the First Congress, though he seriously considered doing so in the
important case of the national bank.' 99 Here too, as with his right to propose
legislation, he seems to have taken a singularly diffident view of his function,
vetoing only two bills in eight years. Some have gone so far as to suggest that he
initially thought that a veto was appropriate only on constitutional grounds.2"'
Neither the text nor the history of the veto provision seemed to support this re-
strictive interpretation, 20' and if Washington ever embraced it he changed his
mind; for he vetoed a bill on pure policy grounds shortly before leaving office in
197. US Const, Art II, § 3. The latter power, wrote Corwin in 1940, "has never been
used," while the former "has been used so often that the word 'extraordinary' in the con-
stitutional clause has taken on a decidedly Pickwickian flavor." Corwin, Office and Powers
at 289 (cited in note 196). For a discussion of the first special session see Currie, 61 U
Chi L Rev at 840 (cited in note 2).
198. US Const, Art I, S 7, cl 3.
199. See Currie, 61 U Chi L Rev at 811-12 (cited in note 2). Washington's hesitation
regarding the bank bill induced him to ask Hamilton a procedural question of con-
stitutional dimension: "To what precise period, by legal interpretation of the constitution,
can the president retain [a bill] in his possession before it becomes a Law by the lapse of
ten days?" Hamilton responded that the President had "ten days exclusive of that on
which the Bill was delivered to you, and sundays," so that a bill presented on Monday
might be returned a week from Friday "at any time while Congress are setting" [sic] - a
plainly reasonable interpretation of the Article I, S 7 provision for return "within ten days
(Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him." See Harold C. Syrett and
Jacob E. Cooke, eds, 8 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 134-35 (Columbia, 1965);
McDonald, Hamilton Biography at 204 (cited in note 3).
200. See McDonald, Washington at 77 (cited in note 3) (stating flatly that this was
Washington's view); Flexner, 4 The New Nation at 281 (cited in note 3) (saying only that
the President believed "a major function" of the veto was "to protect the Constitution").
Washington's first veto was of a 1792 bill apportioning congressional seats in a manner
he thought contrary to the criteria laid down in Art 1, S 2. See Richardson, 1 Messages
and Papers at 124 (cited in note 51). As early as 1789, however, he had asked Madison
whether if Congress passed a bill equating Senate and House salaries he ought to return
it-on the policy ground that he thought "there ought to be a difference in the wages of
the members of the two branches of the Legislature." See Fitzpatrick, ed, 30 Washington
Writings at 394 (cited in note 190). Significantly, none of Washington's advisers seems to
have doubted that the President could veto a bill on constitutional grounds, despite the
widespread assumption that the courts could also review its constitutionality.
201. See Federalist 73 (Hamilton) at 495 (cited in note 158) (defending the President's
veto not only as a check on encroachment upon executive prerogatives but also as a safe-
guard for the community "against the enaction of improper laws"). But see Charles L.
Black, Jr., Some Thoughts on the Veto, 40 L & Contemp Probs 87, 89-90 (Spring 1976)
(stressing the first half of Hamilton's argument in asserting an "original understanding that
the veto would be used only rarely, and certainly not as a means of systematic policy
control over the legislative branch. . . ").
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1797.202
B. EMOLUMENTS AND TITLES
Article II, S 1 provided that the President should "receive for his Services, a
Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period
for which he shall have been elected," and that he should "not receive within
that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them."203
Alexander Hamilton had explained the reasons for these provisions in the
Federalist. "[A] power over a man's support" was "a power over his will"; the
salary guarantee meant that Congress could "neither weaken [the President's]
fortitude by operating upon his necessities; nor corrupt his integrity, by appealing
to his avarice"; the ban on other emoluments assured that he would have "no
pecuniary inducement to renounce or desert the independence intended for him
by the Constitution. ' 2
4
Washington caused something of a stir in his first inaugural address by
disclaiming his constitutional compensation. His sense of duty, he announced,
had always required him to serve his country without remuneration; and thus he
requested Congress in making "estimates for the station in which I am placed"
to provide only for payment of "such actual expenditures as the public good may
be thought to require.
20s
Undeterred, Congress proceeded to debate and enact a statute providing the
President with a twenty-five thousand dollar annual salary.2"' John Page of
Virginia began the House discussion by denying that Washington had the right
to refuse his pay: "[tihe constitution requires that he shall receive a compensa-
tion, and it is our duty to provide it. 2 °7 This was not a frivolous argument, for
the salary provision was not designed for the President's benefit. If the con-
stitutional premise was that financial independence was a crucial barrier to cor-
ruption, an officer who impoverished himself by declining his wages endangered
the public interest. Moreover, if Washington was right that he need not accept
his money, there would always be the risk that a President's waiver was not truly
voluntary; reading the Constitution to mean what it said would obviate the need
for inquiry on this unpromising score.
Thus Congress determined that Washington would be compensated whether
he liked it or not,2"8 and the next question was how much to pay him. This too
202. See Richardson, 1 Messages and Papers at 211-12 (cited in note 51); Corwin, 2
Office and Powers at 284 (cited in note 196). Since this bill would have reduced the size
of the army, Professor Black argued that its veto "may well be thought to fall within the
category of defense of the presidential office ... " Black, 40 L & Contemp Probs at 90
(cited in note 201).
203. US Const, Art II, S 1, cl 7.
204. Federalist 73 (Hamilton) at 493-94 (cited in note 201).
205. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 29 (cited in note 1).
206. Act of July 31, 1789, 1 Stat 72.
207. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 659.
208. Washington accepted the salary despite his inaugural address. See George Washing-
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turned out to be a constitutional question. The House committee had proposed
that in addition to his salary the President be given a separate allowance to pay
for a house, furniture, secretaries, clerks, carriages and horses, 9 and Represen-
tative Laurance objected that this provision conferred an "emolument beyond the
compensation contemplated in the constitution.""' Of course, as Abraham
Baldwin of Georgia responded, it could hardly matter whether the President's
compensation was stated in one provision or in two.211 Laurance's concern,
however, went deeper. The question was whether payment of the President's
expenses was, in the words of Representative Page, "compensation for his
services" 212 at all, and if not, whether it was a forbidden "emolument."
Arguably it was neither. Strictly speaking it compensated the President not
for services but for expenditures, and it did not make him wealthier as a result
of holding office. But if that was true, argued Theodore Sedgwick of Mas-
sachusetts, there would be nothing to prevent Congress from increasing expense
allowances at will; and thus "one of the most salutary clauses in the constitution
[would] be rendered nugatory."213 Internal Revenue agents have since de-
veloped tools for dealing with such problems, but there were additional ob-
jections to the expense provision.2 4 Congress chose to avoid the hornet's nest
by dropping all references to expenses and voting a salary intended to be high
enough to cover them.15
ton Nordham, George Washington and Money 45 (America, 1982). In fact, Washington
was later criticized for consistently overdrawing his salary, although the reasons for his
doing so are disputed. Id at 47-48 (arguing that the overdrafts were reimbursements for
start-up expenses incurred by Washington personally); James Thomas Flexner, Washington:
The Indispensable Man 338-39 (Little, Brown, 1974) (suggesting that Washington may
have been ignorant of the situation because his secretaries kept the accounts). In any
event, Washington bowed to public pressure and stopped taking salary advances.
Nordham, Washington and Money at 48 (cited in this note).
209. See Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 658 (cited in note 1) (remarks of Rep. White).
210. Id at 659.
211. Id at 660.
212. Id at 659.
213. Id.
214. This allocation could scarcely be justified as compensation, said Livermore, since
Congress was directing the President how to spend it; and Congress had no business
dictating "the style in which he shall live." Id at 661. "[No part of the constitution,"
Representative Stone added, "gives us a right to dictate to him on this head." Id.
Laurance had already raised yet another objection with respect to the provision for
secretaries and clerks: to set their salaries would make them officers of the United States,
and to do so would infringe the President's "right to employ a confidential person in the
management of those concerns, for which the constitution has made him responsible." Id
at 659. See the discussion of inferior officers in the text accompanying notes 283-88.
215. The Constitution said nothing about the Vice-President's remuneration, but some
monetary provision was obviously necessary and proper to the exercise of his powers.
Fisher Ames went further, suggesting the Constitution required that the Vice-President be
paid:
Every man is eligible, by the constitution, to be chosen to this office; but if a
competent support is not allowed, the choice will be confined to opulent characters.
This is an aristocratic idea, and contravenes the spirit of the constitution.
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The controversy over the practical question of how much the President
should be paid, however, was pallid in comparison to the dispute that had raged
at the very beginning over the purely formal question of how he should be
addressed. In April, 1789, apparently at the instigation of Vice-President Ad-
ams, 216 a joint committee was appointed to consider "what style or titles [if
any] it will be proper to annex to the offices of President and Vice-President of
the United States." 217 The committee recommended that no titles be added to
those specified in the Constitution, 2 ' and the House agreed. 219 The Senate
balked,"0 and a Senate committee then proposed that the President be ad-
dressed as "His Highness, the President of the United States of America, and Pro-
tector of their Liberties. "221
Maclay argued that any such title would be unconstitutional. The Constitu-
tion had "designated our chief Magistrate by the Appellation of The President of
the U.S. of America," and Congress could neither "add to [n]or diminish it,
without infringing the Constitution." Moreover, Article I, S 9 expressly provided
that "No Title of Nobility sh[ould] be granted by the United States"; "the
appellations & Terms given to Nobility in the old World" were "contraband lan-
guage" in this country.222
Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 674 (cited in note 1).
Significantly, while making the Vice-President presiding officer of the Senate, the
Constitution gave him no executive responsibility beyond being available in case the
President was unable to act. See US Const, Art I, S 3, cl 4; id, Art II, 5 1, cl 6.
Consequently, when a House committee proposed that the Vice-President be paid five
thousand dollars per year, John White of Virginia protested that there was nothing in the
Constitution to assure that he perform services deserving of that princely sum and moved
to allow him the President's salary when acting as President and a per diem such as that
provided to members of Congress when actually present in the Senate. Gales, ed, 1 Annals
at 658, 671.
If he had had anything to do with framing the Constitution, Representative Page
retorted, he might "never have thought of such an officer; but as we have got him, we
must maintain him," and at a level befitting the dignity of his position. Id at 671. Unlike
the members of Congress, Sedgwick argued, the Vice-President "ought to remain constantly
at the seat of Government" in order "to take the reins . . . when they shall fall out of
the hands of the President"; and thus he would be unable to pursue any other occupation
during his term. Id at 672. Madison, Ames, and Boudinot echoed these sentiments, and
the $5,000 salary was approved. See id at 671-76; Act of September 24, 1789, 1 Stat 72.
216. See De Pauw, ed, 9 Documentary History at 4, 27-29 (cited in note 1).
217. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 24. In return for his pains, Adams himself came to be
referred to in private as "His Rotundity." See De Pauw, ed, 9 Documentary History at
33.
218. See Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 257; De Pauw, ed, 9 Documentary History at 28.
219. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 257.
220. Id at 33-34.
221. Id at 36. Maclay recorded a slightly different formulation: "His Highness the
President of the United States of America and Protector of the rights of the same." De
Pauw, ed, 9 Documentary History at 29.
222. De Pauw, 9 Documentary History at 31 (cited in note 1). Representative Page
echoed these arguments in the House. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 331 (cited in note 1).
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This quarrel may seem petty, but in adopting the nobility provision the
Framers themselves had plainly recognized the importance of symbols. One thing
both the Revolution and the Constitution were all about was to substitute a
republic for an aristocracy, and to abjure exalted forms of address served to
underline our commitment to that decision.' When the House refused to
recede from its disagreement, the Senate passed a resolution sulkily affirming the
desirability of additional titles" 4 to assure "a due respect for the majesty of the
people of the United States" in intercourse with other nations but yielding for the
moment in the interest of "preserving harmony with the House of Representa-
tives. "' That was the last that was heard about "His Highness the Protector
of our Liberties"; ever since the President has been simply "the President of the
United States," as Article II provides."6
C. THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The greatest and best known struggle in the First Congress over the structure
of government began on May 19, 1789, when Representative Boudinot moved
to establish three executive departments to aid the President in carrying out his
duties with respect to war, finance, and foreign affairs. ' 7
Virtually no one disputed the necessity for some such legislation. Recognizing
223. See the argument of Representative Tucker, Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 332. Tucker
sounded slightly hysterical, however, in suggesting that the President's title might be the
first step down the road to "a crown and hereditary succession." Id. As Madison argued
in urging his colleagues not to deny the Senate the courtesy of appointing a conference
committee to iron out the disagreement between the two chambers, "I believe a President
of the United States, clothed with all the powers given in the constitution, would not be
a dangerous person to the liberties of America, if you were to load him with all the titles
of Europe or Asia." Id at 333.
224. Maclay reports that Adams at one point in the debate reminded the Senate that
"there were Presidents of Fire Companies & of a Cricket Club." De Pauw, ed, 9 Docu-
mentary History at 28.
225. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 36.
226. On the importance of symbols in the First Congress, see Casper, 30 Wm & Mary
L Rev at 224-25 (cited in note 160). See also Miller, The Federalist Era at 9-10 (cited in
note 3) (noting that the title controversy "consumed virtually all of the Senate's time from
April 23 to May 14" and "revealed the existence of a dangerous fissure within the
Federalist party.").
227. See Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 383-84. The Constitution is surprisingly sparse in
respect to the President's foreign affairs authority, expressly giving him only power to
receive foreign diplomats, to appoint our own, and to make treaties-and in the latter two
cases requiring him to obtain the advice and consent of the Senate. See US Const, Art II,
§5 2-3. In requiring the Secretary of Foreign Affairs not only to carry on such dealings
with our own and foreign ministers but also to conduct "such other matters respecting
foreign affairs" as the President should direct, the First Congress appeared to share the
modem conviction that a general authority over foreign affairs was either implicit in the
unpromisingly drafted specific powers or the general provision vesting executive power in
the President or inherent in the office itself. See Act of July 27, 1789, 1 Stat 28, 29;
United States v Curtiss-Wrigbt Export Corp., 299 US 304 (1936); Currie, The Second
Century at 217-18 n 63 (cited in note 50).
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that the President could not perform the functions entrusted to him all by
himself, Article II authorized him to obtain written advice from "the principal
Officer in each of the executive Departments" and with Senate consent to ap-
point not only judges but also "Ambassadors, other public Ministers, and
Consuls" and "all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are
not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law. "228
Not only did these provisions make clear the expectation that additional execu-
tive offices and departments would be created; they made equally plain that
Congress had power to create them as necessary and proper to the execution of
various powers granted to the President and Congress. 29
Madison gave the members something concrete to chew on by moving to
establish a Department of Foreign Affairs to be headed by a Secretary who was
to be "appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate" and "removable by the President." ' Chew they did; over a month
elapsed before the House passed a bill on the subject, and much of that time was
spent in debating the constitutional conundrums posed by Madison's simple
proposal.
Even the innocuous suggestion that the Secretary be appointed as Article II
prescribed provoked dissent. To provide by law for the method of appointment,
argued Representative Smith of South Carolina, would convey the impression
that Congress was "conferring power," when in fact the Constitution gave it no
discretion; the statute should say nothing about appointment one way or the
other.231 Lee responded that Congress did have a choice, for Article II expressly
authorized Congress "to vest the Appointment of ... inferior Officers" else-
where. 32 The Secretary, he contended, was an inferior officer, because his only
function was to aid the President in performing his duties.33 Under this inter-
pretation, the President alone could have been empowered to appoint everybody
except Justices of the Supreme Court, and it was quickly repudiated. "The infe-
rior officers mentioned in the constitution," said Smith, "are clerks and other
subordinate persons," not the heads of departments; and the reference to
appointment by the President and Senate was struck from Madison's propos-
al.234
228. US Const, Art II, S 2, cl 1-2.
229. See Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 383 (cited in note 1) (Rep. Boudinot). Senator Maclay
thought the President should nominate officers without prior legislation establishing their
offices. See 9 De Pauw, ed, Documentary History at 104-05 (cited in note 1). In the
House, however, "that the principles of organization for the executive offices should be
settled by legislation was taken for granted." Casper, 30 Wm & Mary L Rev at 233
(cited in note 160). For further discussion of this question, see text accompanying notes
273-284.
230. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 385.
231. Id at 386.
232. US Const, Art II, S 2, cl 2.
233. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 386.
234. Id at 386-87. As enacted, the statute made no reference to the method of ap-
pointing the Secretary, but it did provide for a Chief Clerk to be appointed by the
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Smith's second objection was to the provision making the Secretary "remov-
able by the President." For Article II, § 4 provided that civil officers of the
United States should be removed from office when convicted of high crimes and
misdemeanors by the Senate, and that, Smith argued, meant there was no other
way to remove them."5 Madison sensibly replied that the impeachment provi-
sion had been designed to provide "a supplemental security for the good be-
havior of the public officers," not to limit the President's authority to discharge
them,3 and Smith's contrary interpretation received little support from other
members. 27
Theodorick Bland of Virginia had a more challenging basis for complaint
about the provision for presidential removal. If the President could remove an
officer whom the Senate had approved, he might circumvent the Senate's au-
thority by giving a recess appointment to an individual whom the Senators had
already rejected."8 Bland therefore opined that "the same power that ap-
pointed had, or ought to have, the power of removal"; the Senate's power of
consent extended not only to naming officers but to dismissing them as well. 9
Hamilton had said as much in the Federalist,20 but the words did not seem
Secretary himself in accordance with the authority granted by Article II. 1 Stat at 29. This
incident may have some bearing on the Supreme Court's later decision that a special
prosecutor essentially independent of executive, legislative, or judicial control could
constitutionally be appointed by a panel of federal judges. Morrison v Olson, 487 US 654
(1988). Even if Lee's view had prevailed, it might still have been pertinent to ask to what
other officer such a prosecutor could be described as "inferior." Maclay s interpretation
went as far overboard in one direction as Lee's went in the other: he denied that the
Chief Clerk was an "inferior officer," because in the absence of the Secretary he would
run the Department. De Pauw, ed, 9 Documentary History at 118 (cited in note 1).
235. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 387 (cited in note 1).
236. Id at 387. See also id at 393 (Rep. Sylvester); The Federalist No 65 (Hamilton) at
441 (cited in note 158) (arguing that impeachment was "a bridle in the hands of the
legislative body upon the executive servants of the government"). The further suggestion
of Representative Benson, Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 387-88 and Representative Boudinot, id
at 390-91, that Smith's argument would give all officers the tenure during "good behav-
ior" that Article III reserved for judges was clever but flawed, for even Smith's reading
would permit Congress to set fixed terms for other officers. Id at 391-92 (Reps. Jackson
and Smith).
237. Benjamin Huntington of Connecticut broke his habitual silence to echo Smith's
position, Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 477. See also id at 540 (Rep. Page); id at 389 (Rep.
Jackson) (adding that if either the House or the Senate had a constitutional role to play
in removing officers, it could not delegate the task to anyone else, for "every power
recognised by the constitution must remain where it was placed by that instrument").
238. See US Const, Art II, 5 2, cl 3, authorizing the President "to fill up all Vacancies
that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall
expire at the End of their next Session."
239. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 388-89. Livermore added the inevitable comparison to the
treaty power: "I will not by any means suppose that gentlemen mean, when they argue
in favor of removal by the President alone, to contemplate the extension of the power to
the repeal of treaties." Id at 497. The extension that Livermore thought so absurd was
endorsed by the court of appeals and the only Supreme Court Justice to reach the merits
in Goldwater v Carter, 444 US 996, 1007 (1979) (Brennan dissenting).
240. Federalist 77 (Hamilton) at 515 (cited in note 158). Smith read this passage aloud
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to support him; what Article II said was that the President should appoint
officers with the advice and consent of the Senate. As Smith cogently observed,
removal power was not implied in the authority to select the President, Vice-
President, or members of Congress-not even, he noted interestingly, in the case
of the Senate.24' Moreover, the distinction the Constitution seemed to draw be-
tween appointment and removal of executive officers could easily be justified in
terms of Hamilton's own explanation that the purpose of the provision was to
"prevent[] the appointment of unfit characters,"242 although he was right that
a Senate check on removal would also "contribute to the stability of the adminis-
tration."243
In the House debate, Madison was quick to disown the position Hamilton
had taken. "[Olne of the most prominent features of the constitution" was the
President's responsibility for executive affairs. The Senate had been given a say
in the appointing process because as a collective body it had better knowledge of
possible candidates than any individual could have; but that limitation was
consistent with presidential responsibility because unlike a senatorial veto on
removal it permitted "no person" to be "forced upon him as an assistant by any
other branch of the Government." 244
Several other members agreed with Bland,245 but his motion that the pro-
posal be amended to provide for removal "by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate" was defeated.24 It was Gerry who raised the third and final ar-
gument against Madison's proposal: even if neither the Impeachment Clause nor
the Appointments Clause prevented the President from removing the Secretary,
nothing in the Constitution authorized him to do so; and he had only those
powers which the Constitution conferred.247
There were two ways to repulse this attack, and both were employed.
Laurance had already made the defense of confession and avoidance: since the
Constitution did not provide one way or the other, Congress was free-under the
necessary and proper clause, as Thomas Hartley of Pennsylvania later add-
ed24 -to give the President removal power or not, and it made sense to do
so.24 George Clymer of Pennsylvania, in contrast, took the high road of direct
denial: "the power of removal was an executive power" and thus was vested in
with evident relish at a later point in the House discussion. See Gales, ed, 1 Annals at
474.
241. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 392. See the discussion of the role of Senators as repre-
sentatives of the states, text accompanying notes 69-78.
242. Federalist 76 (Hamilton) at 509, 513 (cited in note 158).
243. Federalist 77 (Hamilton) at 515, citing Federalist 76 (Hamilton) (cited in note 158).
244. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 394-95 (cited in note 1).
245. See, for example, id at 389 (Rep. Jackson); id at 391 (Rep. White); id at 395-96
(Rep. Gerry).
246. Id at 397-98.
247. Id at 395. See also id at 475 (Rep. Smith) ("I call upon gentlemen to show me
where it is said that the President shall remove from office.").
248. Id at 500.
249. Id at 392-93.
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the President "by the express words" of Article I."s
It was at this point that in the Committee of the Whole "[t]he question
was... taken, and carried by a considerable majority, in favor of declaring the
power of removal to be in the President."" s The reader will observe that this
resolution left the difference of opinion between Clymer and Laurance unre-
solved. It did not say whether the President had removal power because the
Constitution had given it to him or because Congress in its discretion had chosen
to confer it. The House did not have to answer that question in order to agree
that the President could discharge the Secretary, but it would be crucial if
Congress ever decided to prohibit presidential removal.
The debate was resumed a few weeks later, when a bill was presented to
carry out the principles agreed to in the Committee of the Whole. 2 The House
talked of nothing else for a week. In the process, all the arguments that had been
made before were repeated and enlarged upon. There were also a few new twists,
however. In particular, the difference of opinion among the supporters of
presidential removal was brought into the foreground, and the argument that the
Constitution itself gave the President this authority was substantially reinforced.
When Madison endorsed Clymer's position that removal was an executive
power vested in the President by Article II,s Smith and White leapt to the
attack. There was nothing intrinsically executive about removal, Smith argued;
he knew of no state in which the Governor had any such power. 4 Moreover,
White contended, the Constitution did not give the President all powers that
might abstractly be classified as executive: "the executive powers so vested, are
those enumerated in the constitution."' s
The former argument was troubling, and the latter potentially fatal. For
despite the conspicuous textual contrast between Article II and Article I, which
expressly vested in Congress only those legislative powers "herein granted,""6
it seemed unlikely that the Framers had meant to give the President blanket
authority to do everything that could theoretically be termed executive, especially
since the critical words of Article I had been inserted without explanation by the
Committee of Style; 7 at the very least there seemed to be an implicit restric-
tion to executive matters that could fairly be deemed of federal concern.
Nevertheless, as Fisher Ames pointed out, the case did not depend on the
250. Id at 397.
251. Id at 399.
252. Id at 473.
253. Id at 481. Madison had initially argued that the matter lay in the discretion of
Congress, and he acknowledged his change of mind. See id at 389, 480.
254. Id at 490.
255. Id at 485.
256. US Const, Art I, S 1. Article IH is equally explicit, vesting the judicial power in
specified courts and defining that power to embrace a finite list of disputes.
257. See Farrand, 2 Records of the Federal Convention at 547, 565, 590 (cited in note
40); Charles C. Thach, Jr., The Creation of the Presidency, 1775-1789, in Johns Hopkins
University, 40 Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science 138-39
(1922).
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argument that removal was in itself an unenumerated executive function:
The constitution places all executive power in the hands of the President,
and could he personally execute all the laws, there would be no occasion
for establishing auxiliaries; but the circumscribed powers of human nature
in one man, demand the aid of others ... He must therefore have assis-
tants. But in order that he may be responsible to his country, he must have
a choice in selecting his assistants, a control over them, with power to re-
move them when he finds the qualifications which induced their appoint-
ment cease to exist.
258
In other words, removal authority was implicit in the enumerated powers of the
President, because he could exercise none of them without subordinates subject
to his supervision and control. Madison succinctly restated the point a few min-
utes later: "if the officer when once appointed is not to depend upon the Presi-
dent for his official existence, . . . I confess I do not see how the president can
take care that the laws be faithfully executed. ' 259
It was at this point that Egbert Benson of New York offered an amendment
that was to divide the supporters of presidential removal power. A proposal to
specify the manner of appointment had already been dropped after it was argued
to imply a power of choice foreclosed by Article II;260 Benson made the same
argument with respect to removal. That the Secretary was removable by the
President was the command of the Constitution itself; to say the same thing in
the statute was to suggest that the power was for Congress to give or withhold.
The bill should therefore be amended to acknowledge the President's con;titu-
tional prerogative by providing that the Secretary's custodial duties should
devolve upon his clerk "whenever the said officer shall be removed by the presi-
dent. "261
Sedgwick protested that it made no sense after having won the debate for the
supporters of the removal power to quarrel over a purely academic question. 62
Nevertheless the question was put, and Benson prevailed. The words "whenever
the said officer shall be removed by the President" were inserted,"6 3 and the
words "to be removable by the President" were dropped.264 Thus at first glance
it might appear that the House had agreed with Benson that the Constitution
258. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 492 (cited in note 1).
259. Id at 516. Ames later repeated the point: "[iun the constitution the President is
required to see the laws faithfully executed. He cannot do that without he has a control
over officers appointed to aid him in the performance of his duty [sic]." Id at 561. To
put the argument another way, to place the conduct of foreign affairs in the hands of an
officer not subject to presidential control would offend the Article II command that the
enumerated executive powers be vested in the President. See Morrison, 487 US at 105-07
(Scalia dissenting).
260. See text accompanying notes 225-27.
261. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 525-27.
262. Id at 602.
263. Id at 602-03.
264. Id at 608.
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itself give the President the power of removal."'
Unfortunately the matter was not so simple. For better or worse, the two
halves of Benson's proposal were put to the House separately. The members first
voted thirty to eighteen to add Benson's "whenever" language. All those who
had spoken in favor of presidential removal voted aye, whether they thought that
Article II settled the question or left the matter to Congress. The House then
voted thirty-one to nineteen to drop the phrase "to be removable by the Presi-
dent." The numbers were virtually identical, but it was a different majority. For
on this question the proponents of Article II power prevailed only because they
were joined by a substantial number of members who had opposed presidential
removal altogether.266
The original coalition was patched up again when it came time. for the
House to pass the amended bill,26 7 and after a similar discussion in the Sen-
ate2 68 Benson's "whenever" formula became law.2 69 Thus it was the consid-
ered judgment of a majority in both Houses that the President could remove the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, but there was no consensus as to whether he got
that authority from Congress or from the Constitution itself.2 '0
D. OTHER OFFICERS
Once the great controversy over presidential removal was resolved, Congress
moved quickly to set up War and Treasury Departments, each headed by a
Secretary whose tenure was described by the same "whenever" formula that had
been so painstakingly worked out for the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.271 In
265. Chief Justice Taft took this view of the House's action in Myers v United States,
272 US 52, 112-14 (1926). See also John Marshall, 5 The Life of George Washington
170 (AMS, 2d ed 1969).
266. Fifteen of the thirty members who voted to add "whenever" voted not to delete
"to be removable"; sixteen of the eighteen who voted not to add "whenever" voted to
delete "to be removable." These were the membeis who were opposed to presidential
removal entirely. Only sixteen of the forty-eight who voted on both questions voted for
both, that is, for Benson's substitution. Justice Brandeis worked this all out in his dissent
in Myers, 272 US at 286-87 n 75. See also Corwin, Office and Powers at 87 (cited in
note 196). That was not enough to make him correct on the merits; my own view is that
Ames's argument was overpowering. See Currie, The Second Century at 194-95 (cited in
note S0).
267. The final vote was twenty-nine to twenty-two. See Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 614
(cited in note 1).
268. See De Pauw, ed, 9 Documentary History at 114-15 (cited in note 1).
269. 1 Stat at 29. Vice-President Adams had to cast a tie-breaking vote in the Senate.
See De Pauw, ed, 9 Documentary History at 115.
270. "[Ihe real significance of the debate," wrote Professor Casper, "lies in the
multitude of views expressed about the significance and meaning of separation of powers."
Casper, 30 Wm & Mary L Rev at 237 (cited in note 160).
271. See Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 412; Act of August 5, 1789, 1 Stat 49-50; 1 Stat at
65-67 (1789). The Treasury bill, however, also provided for a Comptroller whose duties
included determining the validity of claims against the government. 1 Star at 66. Because
this task was more judicial than executive, Madison argued, the President should not
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other respects, however, the statute governing the Treasury differed significantly
from those setting up the other two departments. To begin with, the Treasury
was not expressly designated an "executive" department, as the others were.272
Nor was the distinction purely stylistic, for the Treasury Secretary was given
specific duties that made him in part an agent of Congress. For one thing, he was
directed to make estimates of "public revenue" and "public expenditures," which
formed the basis of taxing and spending legislation.273 For another, he was
instructed to report to either House "in person or in writing," on "all matters
referred to him by the Senate or the House of Representatives, or which shall
appertain to his office."274
The debate on these provisions was marked by deep concern over undue
executive influence on the House.27 No one seems to have made the converse
argument that they gave Congress excessive power over the execu-
tive-apparently Alexander Hamilton got exactly what he wanted. 276 Regard-
less of who was encroaching upon whom, the Treasury statute incarnated an
officer with a mix of executive and legislative functions that was remarkable in
a system of supposedly separate powers: "the Secretary ... was seen as an indis-
pensable, direct arm of the House.... 277
control it; either the Comptroller should not be removable, or his decisions should be
subject to Supreme Court review. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 635-37.
This proposal raised more difficulties than it resolved. It was by no means clear that
the Comptroller's function was judicial. Until the Treasury had rejected the claim, it was
hard to identify the adverse parties who characterized the ordinary judicial proceeding.
Moreover, if the matter was judicial, Article III appeared to require that it be decided by
a judge with tenure during good behavior and irreducible salary. US Const, Art III, S 1.
Finally, unless the Comptroller could somehow be considered a judicial officer, it was not
obvious how the Supreme Court could be empowered to review his decision. Under Article
III, unless a state or a (foreign) diplomat was a party, id, S 2, cl 2, the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction was appellate, not original. Madison withdrew his motion after several
colleagues spoke against it. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 637-39. As enacted, the statute said
nothing about the removal of inferior officers. See Act of August 5, 1789, 1 Stat 65-67.
272. See 1 Stat at 28-29 (Foreign Affairs); 1 Star at 49-50 (War); I Stat at 65-67
(Treasury). Nor was the Treasury Secretary, like his two colleagues, explicitly directed to
perform his duties "as the President . . . shall . . . order or instruct." Id at 29 (Foreign
Affairs); id at 50 (War).
273. 1 Stat at 65-66. For some of the first results of this provision see the discussion
of early appropriations in Currie, 61 U Chi L Rev at 795-96 (cited in note 2).
274. 1 Star at 65-66. Hamilton's famous reports on public credit, on the national bank,
and on manufactures, were made on the basis of this provision. Currie, 61 U Chi L Rev
at 795 n 113 (cited in note 2).
275. See note 166.
276. See McDonald, Hamilton Biography at 133 (cited in note 3). In his book on the
Washington Administration, the same author argues that the aim of Congress in enacting
these provisions was "to curtail the executive and aggrandize the House" but that the
result was to enable Hamilton "to become, for practical purposes, an American 'prime
minister.'" McDonald, George Washington at 37 (cited in note 3).
277. Casper, 30 Wm & Mary L Rev at 241 (cited in note 160) (adding that as soon
as Hamilton was confirmed the Committee of Ways and Means was discharged and its
functions were "turned . . . over to him"). See also Corwin, Office and Powers at 79
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Foreign Affairs, War, and the Treasury were the only three executive
departments set up by the First Congress. Representative John Vining of Dela-
ware proposed a Home Department with a variety of largely archival functions,
but, after a brief debate centered on a less than overwhelming cost argument,
many of these duties were added to those of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
who was renamed the Secretary of State.27 Pressed for time, Congress enacted
a temporary measure providing for appointment of a Postmaster General
"subject to the direction of the President," but to carry out duties specified for
his predecessors by the Confederation Congress.27' The Judiciary Act provided
for an Attorney General to render legal advice to the executive and to represent
the United States before the Supreme Court and for District Attorneys to
represent it elsewhere, but they were not part of any executive department, and
the statute did not say who was to appoint or to remove them.80 In prescrib-
ing that each of the government's attorneys be "a meet person learned in the
law,"u1 Congress significantly, if sensibly, restricted the President's discretion
in selecting them. Nobody seems to have suggested that in so doing Congress
(cited in note 196) ("The State and War Departments are principally . . .organs of the
President in the exercise of functions which are assigned him by the Constitution itself,
while the Treasury Department is primarily an instrument for carrying into effect
Congress's constitutional powers in the field of finance."). For the suggestion that the
distinctive Treasury provisions cast doubt on the thesis that the First Congress believed
Article II required a unitary executive, see Lawrence Lessig and Cass R. Sunstein, The
President and the Administration, 94 Colum L Rev 1, 27-30 (1994).
Representative Gerry's motion to replace the Treasury Secretary with a three-member
board raised no constitutional question. It was defeated on the ground that the advantages
of efficient administration outweighed the risk of abuse of authority. See Gales, ed, 1
Annals at 400-12 (cited in note 1).
278. See Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 692-95; Act of September 15, 1789, 1 Stat 68.
Representative Vining observed that it was not obvious why it would be more expensive
for the duties in question to be performed by a new Home Department than by anyone
else. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 694. Nor was there any logical connection between these
responsibilities and those initially assigned to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Representa-
tive Huntington had suggested that the Secretary be chosen because at the moment he
seemed to be "not so much overcharged with business but that he might attend to the
major part of the duties mentioned." Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 693. The implication seemed
to be that by increasing his responsibilities, Congress might avoid having to pay another
Secretary's salary.
279. Act of September 22, 1789, 1 Stat 70; see Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 923, 927-28.
280. Act of September 24, 1789, 1 Stat 73, 92-93. Indeed, the District Attorneys were
supervised not by the Attorney General but by the Secretary of State-a situation that
hardly seemed conducive to the evolution of a uniform legal policy. White, The Federalists
at 406 (cited in note 3). Early drafts of the Judiciary Act had provided that District
Attorneys be appointed by the District Courts and the Attorney General by the Supreme
Court. These provisions disappeared after Robert Livingston wrote (apparently to
Ellsworth) suggesting that the Attorney General should be "appointed by the executive to
which department he necessarily belongs." See Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the
Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism,
1989 Duke L J 561, 567, 571 n 32.
281. 1 Stat at 92.
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offended the appointment provisions of Article 11.282
Other proposals, however, raised important and interesting questions as to
what was included in the President's powers of nomination and appointment. On
several occasions Congress provided by statute for the appointment of officers in-
ferior to the heads of departments." 3 From the beginning, however, there was
evidence of an understanding that other public servants could be appointed
although their offices had never been created by law.
One of Washington's first acts as President was to appoint Gouverneur
Morris, entirely without statutory authority, as "a 'special agent' to explore the
possibility of a commercial treaty with Great Britain.12 4 Maclay once took the
position that he should do the same with the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. 8
282. The following April, however, Representative Scott moved to excise from a bill to
regulate Indian commerce a requirement that the Superintendent of Indian Affairs be a
military officer. Gales, ed, 2 Annals at 1575 (cited in note 1). Scott argued, among other
things, that this restriction both "infringe[d] the power of the President" and "blended the
civil and military characters." Id. In response it was noted that "the President and Senate
are restricted in their appointments of officers in several other departments," and the
Attorney General was cited as an example. Id. When the bill was enacted, the military
qualification had disappeared-the precedents suggested for reasons of policy rather than
constitutional compulsion. Act of July 22, 1790, 1 Star 137. See Corwin, Office and
Powers at 70-71 (cited in note 196) (noting the "vast variety of qualifications" laid down
over the years for federal appointments but adding that it was "universally conceded that
some choice, however small, must be left to the appointing authority").
A different issue respecting the appointment power arose during the second session
in connection with a bill to create a commission to settle accounts between the United
States and the states. Representatives Laurance and Gerry objected to the original draft of
the bill on the ground that by designating the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comp-
troller as members of the Commission it usurped the appointing authority vested in the
President and the Senate. Representative Sedgwick retorted with considerable force that the
Constitution did not forbid Congress to attach additional duties to existing offices, and
Madison argued that since the commission's functions were legislative, Congress could
appoint its members. In the end, the offending language was removed-whether for reasons
of policy or constitutional compulsion was not made clear. See NY Daily Gazette (June
2, 1790); Lloyd's Notes for June 1 and 2, 1790; Gazette of the United States, June 7,
1790; Act of August 5, 1790, 1 Stat 178.
283. For example, 1 Stat at 29 (Chief Clerk in Department of Foreign Affairs); 1 Stat
at 50 (Chief Clerk in Department of War); 1 Stat at 65 (Comptroller, Auditor, Treasurer,
Register, and Assistant to the Secretary). Under the authority conferred by the proviso to
Article II, S 2, Congress provided for appointment of the two chief clerks and of the
assistant by the respective Secretaries; it said nothing about their removal. See also Act of
September 11, 1789, 1 Stat at 67-68 (authorizing each of the three Secretaries to appoint
"such clerks . . . as they shall find necessary").
284. See Miller, The Federalist Era at 13 (cited in note 3); Fitzpatrick, ed, 30 Washing-
ton Writings at 439-42 (cited in note 190). Executive authority to make such appoint-
ments had long existed in England. See Corwin, Office and Powers at 65 (cited in note
196). See also id at 231 (arguing that appointments like that of Morris could "be
reconciled with the Constitution only by invoking the Hamiltonian conception of residual
executive power.").
285. De Pauw, ed, 9 Documentary History at 104-05 (cited in note 1), adding that the
appointment would be subject to Senate confirmation under Article II. But the requirement
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Laurance had gone even further in arguing that to set salaries for the President's
secretaries and clerks would "infringe[] his right to employ a confidential person
in the management of those concerns, for which the constitution has made him
responsible."28 Madison responded that the President had no power to create
offices, 87 and there were other explanations for the omission of the contested
provision. It thus cannot be said that Congress either accepted or rejected
Laurance's interesting contention.
If Laurance's position could be defended on the ground that not every menial
employee was an "officer of the United States," within the meaning of Article
11,288 the same could hardly be said of ambassadors, other public ministers, or
consuls. Yet when Congress turned to providing for intercourse with other
nations in 1790, it conspicuously refrained from creating any such posts at all,
simply authorizing the President to draw up to forty thousand dollars per year
from the Treasury "for the support of such persons as he shall commission to
serve the United States in foreign parts" and to pay their expenses.289
A closer look at the Constitution may suggest why. The assumption that it
is Congress that is to determine which offices are to be filled derives in part from
the Necessary and Proper Clause and in part from Article IU's reference to offices
"which shall be established by Law."29 That qualification, however, appears
to apply only to "other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are
not herein otherwise provided for," not to the preceding and separate provision
for the appointment of "Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, [and]
Judges of the Supreme Court."" 1 The text thus gave some support to Smith's
argument that the President and Senate should "determine when and where to
send ambassadors and other public ministers; all that the House has to do is to
make provision for their support.""2
of Senate consent applies only to officers who are named in that Article or whose offices
are established by law. To permit the President to appoint to additional offices not created
by statute would allow him to circumvent the important check of Senate consent.
286. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 659 (cited in note 1).
287. Id at 662.
288. See Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 126 n 162 (1976); Corwin, Office and Powers at
72 (cited in note 196) (criticizing the accepted distinction between "officers" and "employ-
ees" as a device for "circumventing the apparent purpose of the Constitution" with respect
to the appointment of inferior officers).
289. Act of July 1, 1790, 1 Stat 128.
290. See US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 18; id, Art II, S 2, cl 2.
291. Id, Art II, S 2, cl 2.
292. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 1100. Accord id at 1101 (Rep. White). Representative
Sherman, on the other hand, "was inclined to think that the Legislature ought to
determine how many ministers should be employed abroad." Id. Representative Gerry had
twice moved in the Convention to provide that offices could be established only by
legislation, but without success. Madison had cryptically recorded that such a provision
was "unnecessary." See Farrand, 2 Records of the Federal Convention at 550, 553 (cited
in note 40). Attorney General Cushing relied on the phrasing of the appointment provision
in reaffirming Representative Smith's conclusion in 1855. See 7 Op Att'y Gen 186, 193
(1855). Smith made clear that he viewed Congress's power of the purse as a "check" on
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The textual argument applies to Justices as well as to diplomats, and
Congress fixed the number of the former at six. 93 It may be that Congress
thought it had the power, but not the duty, to fix the number of offices in both
cases and chose to exercise its authority only in the case of the judges. The con-
trast may also suggest, however, that the constitutional principle that dissuaded
Congress from creating particular diplomatic offices was found not in the second
section of Article II, but in the third.
Buried near the end of that section was an apparently innocuous provision
directing the President to "receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers."294
This duty could have been construed in a purely ceremonial sense, but it was
not. It has long been understood that the decision to receive a foreign diplomat
embodies a decision to recognize the government that dispatched him, and thus
that the Reception Clause empowers the President to decide with which gov-
ernments the United States shall have diplomatic relations."' For Congress to
create an embassy to Lower Slobbovia would appear to conflict with this
presidential responsibility; and thus, it is arguable that, as Smith suggested, Con-
gress could not have prescribed where our diplomats should be sent even if it
had been so inclined.296 All that the failure to establish specific diplomatic
offices by statute can fairly be said to prove, however, is that Congress did not
think the Constitution required it to do so before the President and Senate could
fill them.297
Presidential discretion in this regard: If the House "were of opinion that all intercourse
with foreign nations should be cut off, they might decline to make provision for
them. . . ." Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 1100-01 (cited in note 1).
293. 1 Stat at 73.
294. US Const, Art II, S 3.
295. United States v Belmont, 301 US 324, 330 (1937). Compare Belmont with the
conclusion in Luther v Borden, 48 US (7 How) 1 (1849), that it was for each House of
Congress to decide, in determining the qualifications of its own members, whether the
government that sent them was the legitimate government of the state.
296. As Washington tells it, Madison, Jefferson, and Chief Justice John Jay followed this
line of analysis to its logical conclusion: not even the Senate had any say in determining
where to send diplomats; its authority "extend[ed] no farther than to an approbation or
disapprobation of the person nominated by the President, all the rest being Executive and
vested in the President by the Constitution." Fitzpatrick, ed, 4 Washington Diaries at 122
(cited in note 145). For Jefferson's written opinion to this effect, see Julian P. Boyd, ed,
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 378-82 (Princeton, 1961).
297. Ten months earlier, in appropriating twenty thousand dollars to cover the expenses
of negotiating and treating with the Southern Indians, Congress had struck out a provision
authorizing the appointment of not more than three commissioners to perform the
contemplated negotiations after Representative Sedgwick announced that "[hie thought it
a dangerous doctrine to be established, that the House had any authority to interfere in
the management of treaties," although Representative Tucker had argued that commission-
ers could not be appointed unless Congress first created their offices and Representative
Page that the appropriation power enabled Congress to determine how the money was to
be spent. See Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 716-30 (cited in note 1); Act of August 20, 1789,
1 Stat 54 (providing an allowance of eight dollars a day for "each of the commissioners
who may be appointed for managing such negotiations and treaties").
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Yet congressional reticence in this case was not confined to the question of
what diplomatic offices should be established. The statute did not even prescribe
what salary was to be paid to such envoys as the President, with Senate consent,
might decide to appoint. It merely set upper limits to the sums that could be paid
to individual officers, and to the total that could be expended in a single
year.298
The arguments on this provision had been largely a reprise of the controver-
sy over presidential removal, ranging from the suggestion that the determination
of salaries was incident to appointment or to treaty-making and thus could be
made only by the President with Senate consent," to the position that it was
an executive function entrusted to the President alone.3"' Thomas Scott of
Pennsylvania, however, put forward a new argument that had not been available
in the removal debate:
I think disposing of, or giving away sums of public money, is a Legislative,
not an Executive act, and cannot be performed in any other way than with
all the formalities of Legislative authority.3"1
Thus, there was no point in arguing over whether salaries should be set by
the President alone or with Senate consent, because "it would be improper to
give it to either"-the setting of salaries being a legislative responsibility, Con-
gress could not constitutionally delegate it to anyone else.302
This argument was given credence by the provision of Article I, § 9 that no
money should be drawn from the Treasury "but in Consequence of Appropria-
tions made by Law." Of course it was true that the bill did authorize the
withdrawal of funds from the Treasury, but the Constitution arguably required
Congress to determine not only how much to spend but also how to spend it.
Sedgwick replied that Congress had already recognized the necessity for discre-
tionary spending authority in providing for military supply.303 This exchange
was an opening salvo in a continuing battle over the proper degree of specificity
in congressional appropriations. 3"
As in the removal debate, Laurance took the position that the Constitution
did not answer the question,0" and this time the majority evidently agreed. In
298. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 1118-32.
299. Id at 1119-20 (Reps. Lee and Stone); id at 1122-23 (Rep. Sherman) (arguing that
by virtue of these provisions the President and the Senate "ought to act jointly in every
transaction which respects the business of negotiation with foreign powers"). Smith's reply
was the one that had prevailed when the same argument was made with respect to
removal: Article II gave the Senate a role in the appointment of officers but not in deter-
mining their salaries. Id at 1119.
300. Id at 1124-25 (Rep. Benson).
301. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 1127.
302. Id. See also Gazette of the United States (Jan 30, 1790) (Rep. Jackson).
303. See Gales, 1 Annals at 1127-28 ("How else could the business of the quartermas-
ters' or commissaries' departments be performed . . ?").
304. See also Currie, 61 U Chi L Rev at 795-96 (cited in note 2).
305. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 1121; Wright, American Foreign Relations at 312-15, 324-
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prescribing ceilings for the remuneration of various types of officers, Congress
rejected the thesis that the Constitution reserved the matter for the President with
or without consent of the Senate. In leaving it to the President to determine the
appropriate compensation within those limits, it rejected the argument that
salaries could be set only by statute. The bottom line seemed to be that Congress
could decide one way or another under its authority to enact laws necessary and
proper to the execution of powers granted by the Constitution to various officers
and departments of the federal government. °6
IV. The Courts
Article III provided only the broad outlines of the structure and authority of
the federal courts. The judicial power of the United States was to be vested in
"one supreme Court" and in "such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish."3 7 The judges were to "hold their Offices
during good Behavior, '  and their salaries could not be "diminished during
their Continuance in Office."" 9 The judicial power was defined to extend to
an impressively long list of "cases" and "controversies," prominent among which
were federal-question, diversity, and admiralty cases and those to which the
United States was a party.310 If a state or a foreign diplomat was a party, the
Supreme Court was to have "original Jurisdiction"; in all other enumerated cases
it was to have "appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Ex-
ceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.""' The final
provisions of Article III went on to guarantee a jury trial in criminal cases and to
define treason.312
Given the leanness of these constitutional provisions, the question of how
Congress would implement them was of first importance. The Judiciary Act,
largely crafted by Oliver Ellsworth in the Senate and adopted on September 24,
1789,"'3 has been called "probably the most important and the most satisfacto-
ry Act ever passed by Congress."314 Recorded debates were unfortunately
34 (cited in note 136).
306. Consistent with this analysis, Congress now regulates the salaries of diplomats
while still leaving it to the President to determine where to send them. Foreign Service Act
of 1980, Pub L No 96-465, 94 Stat 2071, codified at 22 S 3921. For a period beginning
in 1855, however, Congress also determined which countries were to receive diplomats. See
Act of March 1, 1855, 10 Stat 619; Corwin, Office and Powers at 66 (cited in note
196). For reasons stated above, Attorney General Cushing thought this practice unconstitu-
tional. See note 292.
307. US Const, Art III, S 1.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. See id, S 2, cl 1.
311. Id, cl 2.
312. See id, S 2, cl 3; id, S 3.
313. 1 Stat at 73. See William Garrott Brown, The Life of Oliver Ellsworth 184-86 (Da
Capo, 1970) (first printed in 1904).
314. Justice Henry B. Brown, Address to the American Bar Association (August 20,
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meager," but the act itself established a number of significant constitutional
precedents.
A. THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
The one issue on which significant debate was recorded arose when Tucker
and Livermore argued on policy grounds that Congress ought to limit lower
federal courts to the decision of admiralty cases. 16 Smith responded with the
policy argument that Supreme Court review was inadequate to protect federal
rights,317 but he had constitutional arguments as well. In extending the judicial
power to enumerated categories of cases, he suggested, Article I required the
erection of federal trial courts to determine them, and the tenure provision of the
same Article forbade leaving those cases to state judges "who, in many instances,
hold their places for a limited period.
'31
As Jackson argued, by vesting judicial power in the Supreme Court and
"such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and estab-
lish," Article M seemed to refute Smith's contentions by giving Congress discre-
tion as to the establishment of inferior federal courts. 319 Smith argued that
Congress's discretion extended only to how many inferior courts to establish, not
to whether to establish them at all.320 But the text certainly did not compel this
conclusion. Moreover, the well-known history confirms that the wording ulti-
mately adopted was a compromise between those who thought the Constitution
should itself establish inferior courts and those who thought there should be only
a Supreme Court-Wilson and Madison having justified the change of phrasing
on the ground that "there was a distinction between establishing such tribunals
absolutely, and giving a discretion to the Legislature to establish or not to
establish them."
3 21
Since Congress decided to establish lower federal courts, it did not have to
1911), cited in Charles Warren, 1 The Supreme Court in United States History 12 n 1
(Little, Brown, 1923). See also Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, The Courts and the
Constitution, 60 Temple L Q 829, 832 (1987).
315. "Mr. Benson said, the Senate had employed a great deal of time in perfecting this
bill, and he believed had done it tolerably well; besides, the session was now drawing to
a close; he therefore wished as few alterations as possible to be made in it, lest they
should not get it through before the adjournment." Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 812 (cited. in
note 1).
316. Id at 813-14, 826-28.
317. "[lIt would be felo da se to trust the collection of the revenue of the United States
to the State judicatures." Id at 830. See also id at 843-44 (Rep. Madison).
318. Id at 831-32. See also id at 859-61 (Rep. Gerry). Despite his predictable objection
to the creation of an "expensive and enormous" federal judiciary, Maclay surprisingly con-
cluded at one point not only that the Constitution required federal jurisdiction over all
federal-question cases but also that state courts would have no jurisdiction to decide them.
De Pauw, ed, 9 Documentary History at 10, 85-87, 116 (cited in note 1).
319. US Const, Art 1I, 5 1; Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 833 (cited in note 1).
320. Gales, ed, I Annals at 849-50.
321. Farrand, ed, 1 Records of the Federal Convention at 124-25 (cited in note 40).
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determine whether or not it was required to do so. The statute itself, however,
clearly reveals Congress's conviction that nothing in the Constitution required it
to give federal trial courts jurisdiction over all the cases and controversies
enumerated in Article III. For apart from civil and criminal cases brought by the
Government, the district courts were to sit basically in admiralty, and the circuit
courts in diversity and alienage cases involving more than $500. There was no
general grant of federal-question jurisdiction.3 22
Since Congress did not have to create lower courts at all, it might appear
obvious that it did not have to give them jurisdiction over any particular catego-
ry of cases.3 23 As Justice Story was to demonstrate a generation later, however,
the matter was not so simple. For while Article III gave Congress discretion as to
the existence and powers of inferior federal courts, it also provided in ostensibly
mandatory terms that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend" to the enumerated
classes of cases.324 Arguably the two provisions should have been reconciled by
concluding that the entire judicial power had to be vested in some federal court:
Congress could withhold jurisdiction of particular cases from the inferior courts
only if it permitted the Supreme Court to hear them.32
Congress evidently disagreed, for the Judiciary Act did not satisfy this model.
Diversity cases excluded from the circuit courts by the jurisdictional amount, for
example, were excluded from the federal courts altogether, for the Supreme
Court was given no authority to review state-court judgments in cases in which
diversity was the sole basis of federal jurisdiction.326 Thus, Congress seems to
have agreed with Maryland Representative Michael Stone that the courts were
no more required to exercise the entire judicial power than Congress was
required to exercise all the legislative authority conferred by Article 1.327
One should not be too quick, however, to leap to the further conclusion that
Congress thought it had complete discretion to exclude Article III cases from
322. The Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat 73, 76-79, 5§ 9-12. The district courts also had
jurisdiction of actions "where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States," and of "suits against consuls or vice-consuls,"
id at 76-77, 5 9, while a claimant to land worth more than five hundred dollars under
the grant of a state other than that in which the action was brought could remove to
circuit court under S 12. Id at 79, § 12. For reliance on a semicolon to support the novel
position that the jurisdictional minimum was inapplicable to diversity cases originally filed
in federal court, see Wilfred J. Ritz, Rewriting the History of the Judiciary Act of 1789
57 (Oklahoma, 1990).
323. Sheldon v Sill, 49 US (13 How) 441, 449 (1850) (upholding the clause of 5 11
precluding jurisdiction when diversity of citizenship had been created by assignment of a
chose in action: "[I]t would seem to follow, also, that, having a right to prescribe,
Congress may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerat-
ed controversies.").
324. See US Const, Art III, 5 2, cl 1.
325. Martin v Hunter's Lessee, 14 US (1 Wheat) 304, 330-33 (1816).
326. See 1 Stat at 85-87. The same was true of Government civil cases involving less
than one hundred dollars, which were excluded from the district courts by 5 9. See id at
76-77.
327. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 854-55 (cited in note 1).
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federal courts. As Story also observed, in contrast to federal-question, admiralty,
and diplomatic cases, the Constitution did not expressly extend the judicial
power to "all" controversies between citizens of different states, and the differ-
ence in phrasing might have been deliberate: "The vital importance of all the
cases enumerated in the first class to the national sovereignty, might warrant
such a distinction."328 The First Congress, Story added, seemed, "in a good
degree,... to have adopted this distinction," for "[iun the first class of cases, the
jurisdiction is not limited except by the subject matter; in the second, it is made
materially to depend upon the value in controversy. "329
Indeed the Judiciary Act came suggestively close to giving some federal court
jurisdiction over all cases within the three categories in which Article Il expressly
employed the word "all." Section 9 empowered the district courts to hear "all
civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction";330 S 13 comprehensively
confirmed the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction over cases affecting foreign
diplomats;3 1 and § 25 authorized the Supreme Court to review state-court
judgments in federal-question cases.33 2 Although S 25 was hedged about with
a variety of restrictions, 33 it has been forcefully argued that at the very least it
fulfilled the central constitutional purpose of providing a federal forum to assure
the vindication of federal rights. 34 Significantly, even opponents of broad
328. Martin, 14 US at 334. See also Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Arti-
cle III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 BU L Rev 205 (1985); Akhil
Reed Amar, Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated. A Reply, 138 U Pa L Rev
1651, 1658-60 (1990) (pointing out, among other things, the striking parallel between the
categories of cases with respect to which Article III omitted the word "all" and those with
respect to which an earlier draft would explicitly have left federal jurisdiction to the
discretion of Congress).
329. Martin, 14 US at 336.
330. 1 Stat at 77. Criminal admiralty cases fell within exclusive federal jurisdiction
under § 9 and 11. Id at 77-78.
331. 1 Stat at 76-77, S 9. For reservations as to the completeness of this provision, see
Bator, et al, The Federal Courts at 386-87 n 41 (cited in note 155) (pointing out, among
other things, that there was no provision for removal or appeal if a foreign diplomat sued
in state court).
332. 1 Stat at 85-87, 5 25.
333. Supreme Court review was limited to questions concerning the "validity" of federal
or state action or the "construction" of a constitutional provision, treaty, federal "statute,"
or "commission." 1 Stat at 85-87. Nothing was said about review of questions of federal
common law (which as a modern concept was probably not envisioned at the time), or
the application of federal law (which might have been subsumed under its "construction").
Most notably, review was provided only in cases in which the state court rejected the
claim of federal right. Id at 86.
334. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138
U Pa L Rev 1499, 1529-35 (1990) (arguing imaginatively that in one sense no appeal
arises under federal law unless a federal right has been denied and that to uphold one
party's federal right is generally to deny the other's). For criticism of this view see Daniel
J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U Pa L Rev 1569 (1990); Martin
H. Redish, Text, Structure, and Common Sense in the Interpretation of Article III, 138
U Pa L Rev 1633 (1990).
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federal jurisdiction tended to agree that federal courts should hear cases in these
categories. As Livermore argued, "if we have a Supreme Court, to which appeals
can be carried [in federal-question cases], and an Admiralty Court for deciding
cases of a maritime nature, our system will be useful and complete."3 ' Thus,
while the Judiciary Act clearly reveals Congress's belief that it was not required
to extend federal jurisdiction to all cases or controversies enumerated in Article
III, it does not seem to be a good precedent for congressional power to strip all
federal courts of authority to remedy the denial of a federal right.
In conspicuously declining to give the federal trial courts jurisdiction over all
of the controversies within federal judicial power, and in expressly making the
jurisdiction it did give them "concurrent with the courts of the several States" in
most civil cases,33 Congress clearly rejected any argument that the grant of
judicial power in Article III was exclusive.33 This conclusion does seem to
follow from the Convention compromise, since it seems highly unlikely that the
Framers intended the consequence of a congressional decision not to create lower
federal courts to be that Article III cases outside the Supreme Court's narrow
original jurisdiction could not be heard at all.33 At the same time, the express
statutory provisions making federal jurisdiction in criminal and maritime matters
exclusive testify to Congress's reasonable conclusion that the exclusion of state
courts might sometimes be necessary and proper to effectuate the purposes that
the grant of federal judicial authority was meant to serve.33
The Judiciary Act scrupulously followed the Constitution in assigning to the
inferior federal courts only the decision of "cases" and "controversies" that were
traditionally judicial. In 1790, however, after Hamilton reported that many
shipowners had incurred liability for penalties and forfeitures through ignorance
335. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 827 (cited in note 1). See also id at 832-35 (Rep. Jackson);
Amar, 138 U Pa L Rev at 1549-59 (cited in note 334).
336. See 1 Stat at 77, S 9 (alien tort, government, diversity, and alienage cases). See id
at 80-81 (original but not exclusive jurisdiction of Supreme Court in certain cases).
337. Stone and Livermore both made the interesting suggestion that the Supremacy
Clause required state courts to entertain claims based on federal law, Gales, ed, 1 Annals
at 840-43, 863 (cited in note 1), but Congress cannot be said to have taken a position
one way or another on this suggestion. Compare Testa v Katt, 330 US 386 (1947) and
General Oil Co. v Crain, 209 US 211 (1908).
338. Hamilton had anticipated this question in The Federalist, noting that federal
jurisdiction would normally be concurrent because of the tradition that the courts of one
sovereign regularly heard cases involving the laws of another. The Federalist No 82
(Hamilton) at 555 (cited in note 158). Thus the compromise appears to dispose of Smith's
tenure argument as well. Apparently, the Framers reasonably thought the countervailing
interests of federalism outweighed any danger that state judges might not be sufficiently
independent to decide cases without fear of reprisal, especially since there was little risk
that they would be dominated by the President or Congress. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker,
Article III and Judicial Independence: Why the New Bankruptcy Courts Are Unconstitu-
tional, 70 Georgetown L J 297, 304-05 (1981).
339. See 1 Stat at 76-79, SS 9-12 (also excluding the state courts from suits against
consuls and vice-consuls), and the various provisions for exclusive original Supreme Court
jurisdiction in id at 80-81.
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of the recently enacted tariff and tonnage duties, 4 ' Congress directed district
judges after adversarial proceedings to report the facts to the Secretary of the
Treasury, who was given "power to mitigate or remit" any such penalty "if in
his opinion the same was incurred without wilful negligence or any intention of
fraud." 341 A Senate amendment to the original bill that would have vested
mitigation authority in a committee of three Cabinet officers had been deleted
after objections that it gave judicial power to the executive; 342 yet the act, as
adopted, seemed both to leave this problem unresolved and to compound the
difficulty by conferring purely advisory powers on the judges.343
In only two instances, moreover, did the Judiciary Act arguably give federal
courts jurisdiction over judicial matters outside the enumeration of Article III.
Most suspiciously, if the five hundred dollar minimum was satisfied, § 11
purported to give the circuit courts jurisdiction of all cases in which "an alien
[was] a party," although the corresponding clause of the Constitution spoke only
of controversies "between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects." 344 There was no recorded debate on this provision. In
light of the care exercised elsewhere in the statute to avoid exceeding the limits
implicit in Article IT's enumeration, the Supreme Court may well have been right
to conclude that in this instance, as well, Congress had no intention of going
beyond the constitutional provision."
340. See Currie, 61 U Chi L Rev at 779-85 (cited in note 2) (discussion of tariffs and
tonnage).
341. Act of May 26, 1790, 1 Stat 122, 123.
342. Gales, ed, 2 Annals at 1525 (cited in note 1) (Rep. Gerry).
343. Compare Hayburn's Case, 2 US (2 Dall) 408 (1792), where three circuit courts in-
cluding five of the six Supreme Court Justices struck down a similar provision respecting
military pensions. See also Act of August 12, 1790, 1 Stat at 186, making the Chief
Justice a member of a committee to supervise the repurchase of government obligations.
Given the absence of any incompatibility clause comparable to that forbidding simulta-
neous exercise of legislative and executive functions (US Const, Art I, S 6, cl 2), Congress
evidently saw no constitutional impediment to giving the same officer both judicial and ex-
ecutive functions. See Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361 (1989); Mark Tushnet, Dual
Office Holding and the Constitution: A View from Hayburn's Case, in Maeva Marcus, ed,
Origins of the Federal Judiciary 196 (Oxford, 1992).
344. 1 Stat at 78-79; US Const, Art III, S 2, cl 1.
345. Hodgson v Bowerbank, 9 US (5 Cranch) 303 (1809); Mossman v Higginson, 4 US
(4 Dall) 12 (1800); Currie, The First Hundred Years at 29-30, 89-90 (cited in note 67).
As a stopgap measure, the overburdened legislators directed lower federal courts in com-
mon law cases to follow "the forms of writs and executions, . . . modes of process and
rates of fees" prescribed by state law, but avoided any problem of delegating federal
authority to the states by adopting only those forms, modes, and rates "now used or al-
lowed" in state courts. Act of September 29, 1789, 1 Stat 93. The "forms and modes of
proceedings" in equity and admiralty cases, in contrast, were to be "according to the
course of the civil law"-a less precise reference that arguably left considerable room for
judicial discretion. Id at 93-94. The Necessary and Proper Clause seemed to give Congress
authority to adopt procedural rules for federal courts, though judicial authority to do so
was arguably implicit in Article III's grant of judicial power, and judicial independence
might plausibly be argued to require that judicial authority be exclusive. See Wayman v
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More difficult to explain on this ground was § 9's interesting provision
giving the district courts jurisdiction over "all causes where an alien sues for a
tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.
" 141
Some have argued that the precipitating cause of this enactment was an attack by
one Frenchman on another, and the Second Circuit has recently upheld its
application to a suit between two aliens on the ground that the case arose under
federal law: "[t]he constitutional basis for the Alien Tort Statute is the law of na-
tions, which has always been part of the federal common law."347
B. THE SUPREME COURT
The Judiciary Act also resolved a number of interesting and important
constitutional questions in defining the jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme
Court. First, as already noted, § 25 confirmed the Court's authority to review
federal questions decided by state courts-a conclusion hardly surprising in light
of precedent under the relatively feeble Articles of Confederation34 and the
debates in the Constitutional Convention."' Second, both § 25 and § 22 re-
Southard, 23 US (10 Wheat) 1, 22 (1825); Currie, The First Hundred Years at 117-19
(cited in note 67); People v Cox, 82 I112d 268, 274-75, 412 NE2d 541, (1980) (conclud-
ing that a statute contradicting a judicial rule of procedure would be void). Section 34's
celebrated requirement that "the laws of the several states" should generally "be regarded
as rules of decision" in common law cases in federal court (1 Stat at 92) was to raise an
interesting issue of interpretation. See Erie RR Co. v Tompkins, 304 US 64, 79-80 (1938).
Despite the Supreme Court's conclusion in that case that application of state law was re-
quired by the Constitution, the absence of recorded debate on the provision makes it
impossible to say whether it was enacted on policy grounds or from a sense of constitu-
tional compulsion.
346. 1 Stat at 77, S 9.
347. Filartiga v Pena-Irala, 630 F2d 876, 885 (2d Cir 1980). See Anne-Marie Burley,
The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 Am J Intl
L 461 (1989). An alternative modern explanation might be that by directing federal courts
to apply the law of nations in alien tort actions, Congress, under its implicit foreign
affairs authority, had made it federal law or empowered the courts to adopt it as federal
common law. Compare US Const, Art I, 5 8, cl 10, (explicitly authorizing Congress to
punish criminal offenses against the Law of Nations); Textile Workers v Lincoln Mills,
353 US 448 (1957) (upholding federal-question jurisdiction of an action to enforce a col-
lective-bargaining agreement under S 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 USC 5 185(a)
(1982), on the basis of an implicit statutory grant of power to develop federal common
law).
348. One of the few federal courts provided for by that document was a court of ap-
peal in prize cases. Because there was no corresponding federal trial court, the appeal
court necessarily heard cases coming from state courts, and the Supreme Court approved
this course in Penhallow v Doane's Administrators, 3 US 54 (1795); see Currie, The First
Hundred Years at 49-51 (cited in note 67).
349. Rutledge had argued against the creation of lower federal courts on the ground
that Supreme Court review was adequate to assure both the vindication of federal rights
and the uniformity of federal law. Farrand, ed, 1 Records of the Federal Convention at
124 (cited in note 40). The Supreme Court upheld S 25 in Martin, 14 US at 351; Currie,
The First Hundred Years at 91-96 (cited in note 67).
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flected a broad view of Congress's power to make "exceptions" to the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court s.35  For, as already indicated, the former
section provided for review of state judgments only in federal-question cases,
while the latter made no provision for appellate review of federal criminal
convictions.5s The argument that Congress was authorized to make exceptions
only to Supreme Court review of factual determinations" 2 was thus not the
view of the First Congress. Nor was Congress of the view that it could make no
exceptions to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction without entrusting the excluded
cases to some other federal court, for as also noted above, the statute left sig-
nificant categories of cases outside federal jurisdiction altogether.3S3
The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was defined essentially as in
Article HI itself, embracing cases in which states or foreign diplomats were
parties.35 4 Notably, however, the Supreme Court's jurisdiction in state cases
was limited to "controversies of a civil nature," suggesting that Congress
350. See 1 Stat at 84-87.
351. Id.
352. See Henry J. Merry, Scope of the Supreme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction: Historical
Basis, 47 Minn L Rev 53 (1962). By providing for writ of error rather than appeal, the
Judiciary Act did limit Supreme Court review of the facts-not only in common law
actions, as did the contemporaneously proposed seventh amendment, but in equity and
admiralty cases too. 1 Stat 84-87 SS 22, 25 (1789). Professor Casper views these
provisions, along with those restricting equity powers and guaranteeing the civil jury, as
elements in a general design of the First Congress to democratize and limit the courts-out
of fears lest the judges made independent by Article III might themselves exercise arbitrary
power. See 1 Stat at 77, 80, 82, SS 9, 12, 16; US Const, Amend VII; Gerhard Casper,
The Judiciary Act of 1789 and Judicial Independence, in Marcus, Origins of the Federal
Judiciary 281 (cited in note 343). Five of the first eight amendments, Casper points out,
dealt with "matters mostly concerning the courts." Id.
353. Nevertheless Congress was careful to insist that the Supreme Court be open in
most, if not all, cases in which a state court had denied a federal claim, thus preserving
to a substantial degree the Court's essential authority to keep states from infringing upon
federal constitutional rights. See text accompanying notes 286-290. Moreover, despite the
absence of Supreme Court review of federal criminal convictions, the principle of judicial
review that would be confirmed in Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), en-
sured that even in such cases constitutional objections would be heard by some federal
court. See id. Arguably the most serious failing of the Judiciary Act from the standpoint
of an adequate modem system of judicial review was the absence of any provision guaran-
teeing access to the courts to those injured by public officers who acted illegally without
seeking judicial assistance. Compare 42 USC S 1983 (1988) with 28 USC S 1343(a)(3)
(1988). Apparently the First Congress thought no such provision was constitutionally re-
quired. Compare Grundgesetz [Basic Law] Art 19(4) (FRG) (Should any person's right be
violated by public authority, recourse to the court shall be open to him); Bivens v Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 US 388 (1971) (semble).
354. 1 Stat 80-81 5 13 (1789). Compare US Const, Art III, S 2, cl 2. Like that of the
inferior courts, this jurisdiction was partly concurrent and partly exclusive. See text
accompanying notes 291-94. By essentially repeating the Constitution's general reference to
matters "in which a State shall be Party," this section did nothing to resolve the question
whether a state could be made defendant, and nothing was said on the subject during
debate. US Const, Art H, S 2, cl 2; see Chisholm v Georgia, 2 US (2 Dall) 419 (1793).
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believed either that criminal cases fell outside the constitutional provision for
"cases . . in which a state shall be party," or that it was not required to vest in
the Supreme Court the entire original jurisdiction defined by Article III." Both
of these interpretations seem doubtful. First, although the disputes to which the
judicial power was extended by virtue of the state's presence as a litigant were
described by the arguably narrower term "controversies" rather than "cases," the
Framers seemed to treat the two terms as equivalent in giving the Supreme Court
original jurisdiction of "cases" to which a state was a party. 56 In addition, the
reasons for jurisdiction seem as strong in criminal as in civil cases.35 ' The
explicit provision authorizing Congress to make exceptions to the appellate ju-
risdiction,"' moreover, casts considerable doubt on the alternative hypothesis
that Congress may make exceptions from the original jurisdiction as well.
Buried at the end of § 13 was a provision authorizing the Supreme Court to
issue writs of mandamus "to any courts appointed, or persons holding office,
under the authority of the United States."3"9 This was the provision that
Marbury v Madison struck down on the ground that Congress had no power to
expand the original jurisdiction beyond those cases enumerated in Article 111.361
The constitutional question could easily have gone the other way,36 ' but it
would be wrong to conclude that Congress interpreted Article III differently from
the Court. Because the authority to issue mandamus appears in a sentence
otherwise dedicated to appellate jurisdiction it seems likely that the mandamus
power was meant to be appellate as well. 362
In contrast to its later decision with respect to diplomatic appointments,363
Congress set the number of Justices at six. 34 This provision need not imply
that Congress thought the Constitution required it to fix the number of Justices,
since there were obvious reasons of policy for having precisely six. The figure
was inconvenient, since as Jackson noted, an even number would enhance the
risk of stalemate. 6 But six Justices made sense in terms of Congress's addi-
tional decision to divide the country into three judicial circuits, and to assign two
355. 1 Stat 80-81 S 13 (1789); US Const, Art I1, 5 2.
356. 1 Stat 80-81 S 13 (1789).
357. But see Wisconsin v Pelican Insurance Co., 127 US 265, 300 (1888) (holding that
the Court did not have original jurisdiction to compel a Louisiana corporation to pay a
fine to the state of Wisconsin for violating a Wisconsin law).
358. US Const, Art III, 5 2, cl 2.
359. 1 Stat at 81.
360. Marbury, 5 US at 171-80.
361. See Cohens v Virginia, 19 US (6 Wheat) 264, 399-402 (1821) (limiting the
Marbury dictum); Bdrs v Preston, 111 US 252, 260 (1884) (holding Congress could
constitutionally give the Court appellate jurisdiction where Article III said it should have
original).
362. See Currie, The First Hundred Years at 67-68 (cited in note 67).
363. See text accompanying notes 255-69.
364. 1 Stat at 73, S 1.
365. Gales, ed, 1 Annals at 812 (cited in note 1).
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Justices to each of the circuit courts.""
No one is reported as objecting at the time, but the Justices themselves were
soon to protest against this additional assignment on both constitutional and
practical grounds. 367 The most serious constitutional argument was that, when
sitting on circuit, the Justices would be expected to act as trial judges in cases
not within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. The response that, in so
doing, they were not acting as the Supreme Court raised a constitutional difficul-
ty of its own: if they were to exercise two offices, they arguably had to be given
two appointments under Article II.
When these issues reached the Supreme Court in 1803, the Court upheld
Congress's power to impose circuit duties on the Justices without reaching the
merits: "practice and acquiescence under it for a period of several years, com-
mencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistible
answe; and has indeed fixed the construction."3 6' The provision for circuit
riding thus illustrates in starkest form the influence that congressional interpre-
tation of the Constitution can have on the course of judicial decision.
V. Conclusion
It should be plain from this summary that both the first President and the
First Congress took the Constitution very seriously. Constitutional questions
cropped up in the House and Senate every time somebody sneezed, and one pro-
posal after another was subjected to intensive debate to determine its compatibil-
ity with relevant constitutional provisions. Members of Congress plainly thought
it necessary to demonstrate that the Constitution supported their actions, and
thus everything they did, as well as everything they said, helps to inform our
understanding of particular constitutional provisions.
The arguments employed during the First Congress helped also to develop an
understanding of the techniques of constitutional interpretation. Most of the
tools of construction we recognize today were employed in the debates: text,
structure, history, purpose, practice, and the avoidance of absurd consequences.
Despite the deliberate decision of the Convention not to publish an official
record of its proceedings, various members invoked their recollection of events
at Philadelphia to illuminate the meaning of particular provisions; they were met
with very modern arguments for ignoring them.
The quality of the constitutional debates in the First Congress was impres-
sively high. The members exhibited an intimate knowledge of what the Constitu-
tion actually said. Moreover, they had obviously devoted considerable effort to
trying to figure out what its various provisions might mean. In the great contro-
versy over removal of cabinet officers, for instance, the House debates brought
366. 1 Stat 74-75, S 4.
367. See Joseph Story, 3 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States S 1573,
n 1 (Brown Shattuck Co, 1833).
368. Stuart v Laird, 5 US (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803); Currie, The First Hundred Years
at 74-77 (cited in note 67).
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forth virtually all the constitutional arguments that anyone has come up with in
two centuries of second-guessing-as they did on many other issues of greater or
lesser importance, which as a practical matter they settled for all time.
In short, not only the debates, but also the actions taken or rejected by the
First Congress, constitute a practical interpretation of the Constitution by able
and diligent officers sworn to support it and charged with the responsibility to
put it into practice. The legislative interpretation was not binding. It was not
always unanimous. It was not always convincing. It was not always clear that
Congress was even aware of the existence of a constitutional problem. Some-
times, like judges, members of Congress must have been advocates for a prede-
termined position. Nevertheless, the records of the First Congress afford impor-
tant evidence of what thoughtful and responsible public servants close to the
adoption of the Constitution thought it meant. What they thought is surely of
interest not only to historians, but also to anyone trying two hundred years later
to figure out what the Constitution means.
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